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CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE,
INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND TEXT:
REVISITING CHARLES BLACK’S WHITE
LECTURES
Richard C. Boldt*
Fundamental questions about constitutional interpretation and
meaning invite a close examination of the complicated origins and the
subsequent elaboration of the very structure of federalism. The
available records of the Proceedings in the Federal Convention make
clear that the Framers entertained two approaches to delineating the
powers of the central government relative to those retained by the
states. The competing approaches, one reliant on a formalist
enumeration of permissible powers, the other operating functionally on
the basis of a broad dynamic concept of state incompetence and
national interest, often are presented as mutually inconsistent
narratives. In fact, these two approaches can be understood, at the
founding and at critical junctures along the way, as capable of
coexisting in a complex, sometimes uncomfortable, arrangement that
draws both upon structural and specific textual elements of grant or
prohibition to police the line between central government powers and
those retained by the states.
Some of the specific provisions of grant or prohibition in the
Constitution have held up well over the course of our nation’s history,
but others have fallen out of alignment with the underlying economic,
social, and political context within which the Constitution must operate.
In those instances, significant pressure has been placed on the
Necessary and Proper Clause to bring constitutional doctrine into
alignment with contemporary circumstance and, indirectly, with the
deeper structures and relationships that ground the constitutional
order. Consistent with the insights offered decades ago by Professor
Charles Black, this Article argues that the Supreme Court better serves
the constitutional order when it draws inferences directly from those
deeper structures and institutional relationships, which were embedded
in the original Constitution and which have endured and been
* T. Carroll Brown Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School
of Law. I thank Eileen Canfield, Dan Friedman, Mark Graber, Susan McCarty, Jana Singer,
Maxwell Stearns, and Gordon Young for their invaluable assistance in the development of this
Article. I also thank the participants of the University of Maryland Comparative Constitutional
Democracy Colloquium for their insights and critiques.
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reaffirmed over time, and avoids a strained reading either of the
enumerated power itself or of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
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INTRODUCTION
Among Professor Charles Black’s many contributions to the
constitutional law literature, perhaps his most important is contained
in a slight book, derived from his Edward Douglass White Lectures
on Citizenship at the Louisiana State University, on the role that
structure and relationship plays, and should play, in constitutional
interpretation.1 A centerpiece of Black’s analysis was his discussion
of Chief Justice Marshall’s towering opinion in McCulloch v.
Maryland,2 and in particular, Marshall’s treatment of the Necessary
and Proper Clause.3 Professor Black’s position was that Marshall did
not rely on that specific bit of text as the basis for finding national
government power to create a national bank, but instead considered it
in order to dispel the argument, originally advanced by Thomas
Jefferson and others during the debate over the first national bank,4
that the Necessary and Proper Clause actually serves a limiting
function on the powers enumerated for exercise by Congress.5 Black
powerfully demonstrated that Marshall’s understanding of federal
regulatory power was grounded in the broader structure of the whole
constitutional system and in the institutional relationships set up in
the Constitution. Black’s view was that understanding federalism
issues in this functionalist fashion frequently is superior to the more
formalist, text-focused approach that the Court has from time-to-time
adopted in the Commerce Clause area and elsewhere.6

1. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1969).
2. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
3. See BLACK, supra note 1, at 13–15. The Necessary and Proper Clause provides that
Congress shall have the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 18.
4. For a discussion of the arguments advanced by Thomas Jefferson in response to
President George Washington’s request that he and several other cabinet members provide an
opinion on the constitutionality of the First Bank of the United States, see Randy E. Barnett, The
Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 195–96
(2003); see also J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 602 (discussing Marshall’s refutation of Maryland’s narrow
construction of the term “necessary”).
5. See BLACK, supra note 1, at 14.
6. See id. at 22–23. For an overview of formalist and functionalist methods of constitutional
interpretation in the federalism area, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in
Federalism Analysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959 (1997).

(6) 54.3_BOLDT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

6/20/21 2:36 PM

REVISITING CHARLES BLACK’S WHITE LECTURES

679

Recently, in United States v. Comstock,7 a case in which the
federal government’s authority to civilly commit so-called sexual
predators was challenged on the ground that the authorizing statute
exceeded the central government’s enumerated and implied
authority, the majority relied on the Necessary and Proper Clause as
a distinct source of federal lawmaking power.8 That reading, and a
similar approach in relatively recent Commerce Clause cases and
others raising the question of federal authority,9 is in some tension
with Professor Black’s vision because it fails to exploit the
interpretive potential of the broader structural values recognized in
McCulloch.10 This Article argues that Professor Black’s approach
frequently is a superior way to think through difficult questions of
federalism, and would, if adopted, promote candor and improved
collaboration between the judiciary and the political branches.
A full consideration of the Necessary and Proper Clause
implicates institutional questions, questions of interpretive
methodology, and questions of meaning. Some recent scholarship
has focused on the institutional question, arguing either that the
Supreme Court should be deferential to Congress’s assertions of
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause or that the Court
should exercise a measure of independent judgment with respect to
the reach of that provision.11 On the question of the meaning of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, provocative historical accounts have
become available that seek to connect contemporary understandings
of the Necessary and Proper Clause to eighteenth-century English
usage derived from agency law, administrative law, and corporations

7. 560 U.S. 126 (2010).
8. Id. at 129–30. The Court read the Necessary and Proper Clause as conferring incidental
lawmaking power beyond that provided in the other enumerated provisions in Article I, Section 8,
but in support of those enumerated powers. For a further discussion of Comstock, see infra text
accompanying notes 216–20.
9. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33–35 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
10. The Comstock majority opinion does show some ambivalence in this regard by referring
at times to the effect of the Necessary and Proper Clause as “granting” power to Congress and at
others as merely confirming the existence of such authority. See infra text accompanying notes
216–19.
11. Compare John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term—Foreword: The Means of
Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2014) (reading the Necessary and Proper
Clause as conferring broad implementing authority on Congress to which the Court should show
deference), with William Baude, Sharing the Necessary and Proper Clause, 128 HARV. L. REV.
F. 39, 46–47 (2014) (arguing that the text and historical practice permit greater judicial authority
and require less deference to Congress).
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law.12 Implicit in these efforts is the notion that the constitutional
phrase reflected, and likely was understood at the time to embody,
existing pre-constitutional legal constructs having to do with the
obligations of fiduciaries to exercise reasonable judgment in tasks
otherwise assigned to them.13
This effort to uncover and describe older English legal
constructs that likely were familiar to the Framers and other lawyers
of their generation, in order to assist in the interpretation of the
constitutional text as it was promulgated and ratified, implicates
questions of interpretive methodology. Should the existence and
scope of federal powers turn, in the first instance, on the best reading
of specific constitutional language, including the Necessary and
Proper Clause, or should the interpretive project be centered on
structure and institutional relationship? And if constitutional text is
the starting point, should the focus be on “passages of grant or
prohibition,” or instead on passages that “recognize political and
societal structures”?14 If specific text is to play a central role in the
interpretive process, is original intention or original meaning15—
perhaps informed by historical accounts of pre-existing private law
constructs or by accounts of the deliberations that took place in the
constitutional convention or during the ratification process16—the
best or even a good way to engage the words on the page? And,
12. See GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN,
THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 119 (2010).
13. Professor Natelson, for example, argues that the Necessary and Proper Clause drew upon
principles of British agency law that included a requirement of reasonableness and other fiduciary
obligations of good faith and due care. See id. John Manning points out, however, that the phrase
“necessary and proper” appeared in a wide variety of other eighteenth-century public law contexts
and that Natelson and his co-authors do not necessarily claim one uniform or consistent meaning
for the phrase. See John F. Manning, The Necessary and Proper Clause and Its Legal
Antecedents, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1349, 1373–74 (2012).
14. Vince Blasi, Creativity and Legitimacy in Constitutional Law, 80 YALE L.J. 176, 182
(1970) (reviewing CHARLES L. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1969)).
15. On the differences between the “old originalism,” which focused on the “the concrete
intentions of individual drafters of [the] constitution,” and the “new originalism,” which focuses
instead on the “public meaning of the text that was adopted,” see Keith E. Whittington, The New
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599–613 (2004). For a careful parsing of the terms
“meaning,” “intention,” and “understanding,” all of which are common in originalist analysis, see
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 7–11 (1996).
16. See generally Barnett, supra note 4, at 183–221 (exploring the “original public meaning
of the Necessary and Proper Clause” and highlighting the difference between “the subjective
original intent of the framers . . . [and] the original meaning”).
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finally, does the evidence of original meaning support an analytic
approach to federalism issues that focuses on the enumeration of
powers found in Article I, Section 8, together with the Necessary and
Proper Clause, or does that evidence encourage us to engage more
attentively the consideration of constitutional structure and
institutional relationships that Professor Black urges?
These fundamental questions about constitutional interpretation
and meaning implicate the uncertain text and promulgation history of
the Necessary and Proper Clause. With respect to the uncertainty of
the language, Chief Justice Marshall pointedly noted in McCulloch
that even if that clause were to be given independent linguistic and
legal significance, the word “necessary” in that provision “has not a
fixed character peculiar to itself. It admits of all degrees of
comparison; and is often connected with other words . . . . A thing
may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably
necessary.”17 With respect to the clause’s promulgation history, the
historical evidence is far from clear as to what motivated the
convention participants to insert this provision and what it was meant
to accomplish.18 Some scholars argue that the phrase was included to
ensure that the central government’s express general powers would
be supplemented by additional authority to enact implementing
measures reaching beyond the strict limits of the enumerations.19
Others point to statements at the time indicating that the clause was
regarded as redundant to, and at best confirming of, implied powers
already conveyed in the constitutional arrangements the Framers had
settled on.20
In addition, however, these fundamental questions about
interpretation and meaning also invite a closer examination of the
complicated origins and the subsequent elaboration of the very
structure of federalism at the foundations of the constitutional regime
itself. The available records of the Proceedings in the Federal
Convention make clear that the Framers entertained conflicting
approaches to delineating the powers of the central government
17. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414–15 (1819). But see Barnett, supra
note 4, at 204–05 (relying on notes from the Constitutional Convention to argue that the Framers’
choice of words in this respect was “considerably less deliberat[e]” than Marshall suggested).
18. Barnett, supra note 4, at 204–05.
19. See Manning, supra note 11, at 6–7.
20. See Barnett, supra note 4, at 185–86 (tracing this view to Federalist supporters of the
Constitution, such as George Nicholas of Virginia).
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relative to those retained by the states. In a series of debates and
votes taken in May and July of 1787, the members of the Convention
approved language granting generalized power to the federal
government delimited functionally by reference to the incompetence
of the individual states.21 Thus, on July 17, 1787, a majority of the
delegates, voting by state, approved language that would permit the
federal legislature “to legislate in all cases for the general interests of
the Union, and also in those to which the States are separately
incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be
interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.”22 In August of
1787, however, the Committee of Detail presented a report to the full
Convention that contained an enumeration of powers to be held by
the legislature of the central government, and that contained at its
conclusion a necessary and proper clause.23 This formulation, of
course, found its way into Article I, Section 8 of the version of the
Constitution that was ultimately presented to the states and ratified.24
Constitutional lawyers, academics, and others have offered
competing interpretations of this history, which are relevant to the
questions of constitutional interpretation and meaning raised by
Professor Black’s appeal to reasoning from structure and
relationship. By one account, “[t]he enumeration by the Committee
of Detail, which the Convention employed as a basis for final action,
should be construed to reach towards the same generalized grant of
power to the national government which the Convention had earlier
approved.”25 This account fits most comfortably with an approach to
federalism based on structural reasoning.26 From another perspective,
21. See Day-by-Day Summary of the Convention, TEACHING AM. HIST.,
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/resources/convention/summary/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).
22. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)
[hereinafter THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 2].
23. Id. at 176, 181–82.
24. See id. at 181–82 (Madison’s Notes).
25. JONATHAN D. VARAT & VIKRAM D. AMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 107 (15th ed. 2017).
26. While Charles Black’s White Lectures describe one approach to reasoning from structure
and relationship, other scholars have offered a broader account of structural constitutional
interpretation. Brannon Denning and Glenn Harlan Reynolds, for example, have suggested that
structural reasoning draws upon “inferences derived from related constitutional provisions, the
overall structure of the Constitution, and the principles that animated its framing.” Brannon P.
Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1089–90
(1997). Philip Bobbitt has explained that,
the structural approach, unlike much doctrinalism, is grounded in the actual text of the
Constitution. But, unlike textualist arguments, the passages that are significant are not
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however, “[t]he decision to enumerate the powers of Congress
reflects a decision sharply to circumscribe national power.”27 This
perspective is much more difficult to square with a broad structural
interpretive approach, and imposes on the Necessary and Proper
Clause a potentially significant role in providing the constitutional
basis for finding the incidental powers required by Congress.
These competing approaches to marking out the boundaries of
the American federalist system, one reliant on a formalist
enumeration of permissible powers, the other operating functionally
on the basis of a broad dynamic concept of state incompetence and
national interest, have been present from the very beginning of our
constitutional order and often are presented as mutually inconsistent
narratives. In fact, these two approaches can be understood, at the
founding and at critical junctures along the way, as capable of
coexisting in a complex, sometimes uncomfortable, arrangement; an
arrangement which supports an interpretive approach that draws both
upon structural and specific textual elements “directive of action” to
police the line between central government powers and those
retained by the states.28
Some of the specific provisions in Article I, Section 8 have held
up well over the course of our nation’s history, but others have fallen
out of alignment with the underlying economic, social, and political
context within which the Constitution must operate. In those
instances, where a specific textual grant of power represents a
those of express grants of power or particular prohibitions but instead those which, by
setting up structures of a certain kind, permit us to draw the requirements of the
relationships among structures.
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 80 (1982).
27. VARAT & AMAR, supra note 25, at 107.
28. BLACK, supra note 1, at 7. Jack Rakove has described “two complementary sets of
meanings” with which Americans have “endowed” the Constitution since it was presented for
ratification in 1787. RAKOVE, supra note 15, at 11. One meaning derives from the Constitution
“[t]aken as a whole—which is how the ratifiers had to take it.” Id. The other is made up of a
series of disputes about the import of individual clauses. Id. Rakove knits together these two
meanings in the following terms:
The Constitution has thus always represented something more than the sum of its parts.
But since 1789, most disputes about its meaning have necessarily centered on its
individual clauses. No single clause or provision can be interpreted without considering
its relation to the document as a whole. Yet in practice, the enterprise of interpretation
often requires an intense analysis of key words and brief phrases that the Constitution
itself does not define. . . . These two conceptions of the meaning of the Constitution are
complementary, not contradictory.
Id. at 11–12.
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miscalculation, significant pressure has been placed on the Necessary
and Proper Clause to bring constitutional doctrine into alignment
with contemporary circumstance and, indirectly, with the deeper
structures and relationships that ground the constitutional order. This
Article argues that the Supreme Court better serves the constitutional
order when it draws inferences directly from those deeper structures
and institutional relationships, which have endured and have been
reaffirmed over time, and avoids a strained reading either of the
enumerated power itself or of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The remainder of this Article elaborates this alternative
interpretive approach. The discussion proceeds as follows: Part I
takes up Professor Black’s theory of reasoning from structure and
relationship and explores its operation relative to more conventional
approaches to reading the Constitution. Part II examines the state
incompetence principle and the turn to an enumerative approach in
the Framers’ adoption of Article 1, Section 8, and then offers an
account of the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause that helps to reconcile these competing elements in
our constitutional tradition. Part III explores the reasoning of the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts with respect to the Necessary and
Proper Clause, which has been characterized as a new form of
structuralism and has been linked to the interpretive approach set out
in Charles Black’s work, and argues that, while an accurate account
of the modern Court’s cases, this is a misreading of Black. The
Article then concludes by applying Professor Black’s theory of
structure and relationship to some contemporary federalism cases in
order to demonstrate how it might function to help reconcile notions
of fidelity to an original constitutional master text with a coexisting
“living discursive tradition” of constitutional elaboration and
development.29

29. Peter G. Danchin, From Parliamentary to Judicial Supremacy: Reflections in Honour of
the Constitutionalism of Justice Moseneke, 17 ACTA JURIDICA 29, 36 (2017); see also Jack M.
Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 293 (2007) (describing a
form of constitutional interpretation that “requires fidelity to the original meaning of the
Constitution and to the principles that underlie the text,” but which is “consistent with a basic law
whose reach and application evolve over time, a basic law that leaves to each generation the task
of how to make sense of the Constitution’s words and principles”).
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PART I
A. Charles Black on Reasoning from Constitutional Structures and
Institutional Relationships
In the first of three lectures delivered at the Louisiana State
University in 1968 as the Edward Douglass White Lectures,
Professor Black described the prevailing approach to interpretation in
American constitutional thought in the following terms:
[I]n dealing with questions of constitutional law, we have
preferred the method of purported explication or exegesis of
the particular textual passage considered as a direction of
action, as opposed to the method of inference from the
structures and relationships created by the constitution in all
its parts or in some principal part.30
To illustrate how this “preference of intellectual method”31 has
operated over time, and to demonstrate the potential benefits of his
proffered alternative, Professor Black marched onto center stage a
series of Supreme Court decisions that would have been entirely
familiar to students of constitutional law at the time. The illustrative
cases are not all federalism decisions. They included, among others,
an Equal Protection case,32 a First Amendment opinion,33 a state
action decision,34 and, of course, McCulloch v. Maryland.35 Black’s
purpose in discussing each of these cases was not to dismiss the use
of specific directive constitutional language as the basis for
adjudicating constitutional conflicts, but to call into question the
heavy reliance on that approach that has grown up in American
constitutional law.36 By contrast, Professor Black drew out of his
selected cases a collection of “structures and relationships”—a
30. BLACK, supra note 1, at 7. Professor Black characterized this way of thinking as
incomplete, due to its failure to develop a “full-bodied case-law of inference from constitutional
structure and relation but even to a preference, among texts, for those which are in form directive
of official conduct, rather than for those that declare or create a relationship out of the existence
of which inference could be drawn.” Id. at 8.
31. Id. at 3.
32. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
33. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
34. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
35. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
36. See BLACK, supra note 1, at 21. “Black is thus protesting not the exclusivity of the
textual mode so much as the ‘stylistic preference’ by which judges . . . have come to employ the
reasoning process of textual interpretation over that of structural and relational inference.” Blasi,
supra note 14, at 180.
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phrase he treated as something of a term of art—that he suggested
the Court in each instance might have deployed as the anchor for an
alternative analytic approach, often supporting the same outcomes
that the majority decisions in fact reached on the basis of inference
from narrower textual grounds.37 Black’s catalogue of structures and
relationships comprises a collection of constitutional principles that
are “either established in some detail by the text of the Constitution
or else . . . plainly envisioned by an important provision of that
text.”38 Three of these structural principles are of particular relevance
to the ongoing struggle over the contours of federalism: (1) “the bare
existence, irrespective of its character, of a federal government that is
supreme over the state governments;” (2) “the economic structure of
nationhood;” and (3) a structure of “national unity,” which, among
other things, “warrants inference as to mobility of population.”39
Professor Black was not cavalier in his identification of the
structures and relationships he regarded as fundamental, and it is
difficult to quarrel with his judgment that these principles are
“soundly enough established to furnish a basis” for resolving
constitutional disputes.40 Indeed, he assembled a group of principles
that virtually all constitutional lawyers would regard as essential
elements of our constitutional tradition.41 Given this universality,
Black argued, it is disappointing how infrequently these principles
have been relied upon by the Supreme Court as the doctrinal
foundation for individual decisions.42
Black convincingly demonstrated that Chief Justice Marshall’s
opinion in McCulloch is an exception to this pattern. Students of
Marshall’s opinion are familiar with the essentially structural
approach to the second issue in the case, the question whether the
state of Maryland could impose a tax on the operation of a national
instrumentality, the Second National Bank.43 Clearly, Marshall’s
emphasis on “the warranted relational proprieties between the
37. See BLACK, supra note 1, at 8–29.
38. Blasi, supra note 14, at 182.
39. Id.; BLACK, supra note 1, at 20–21, 28. In addition to these essential structural
principles, Black also identified the central role that the electorate plays in the federal
government, the availability of federal judicial forums for citizens’ grievances, and the concept of
citizenship. See Blasi, supra note 14, at 182.
40. BLACK, supra note 1, at 23.
41. See Blasi, supra note 14, at 182–83.
42. See BLACK, supra note 1, at 31–32.
43. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425–37 (1819).
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national government and the government of the states” and the
“structural corollaries of national supremacy”44 was dispositive of
the issue.45 But, Black argued, Marshall’s treatment of the first issue,
whether the national government had the constitutional authority to
charter a national bank, is also essentially structural, notwithstanding
the Court’s familiar discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause.46
Black explained,
[a] reasonably careful reading shows that Marshall does not
place principal reliance on this clause as a ground of
decision; that before he reaches it he has already decided,
on the basis of far more general implications, that Congress
possesses the power, not expressly named, of establishing a
bank and chartering corporations.47
This process of drawing legally dispositive inferences from
structures and relationships embedded in the whole Constitution
rather than from individual constitutional provisions that grant power
or set express prohibitions is not entirely foreign to American
constitutional practice after McCulloch.48 For example, Justice
Douglas’s majority opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut49 deployed
structural reasoning to find a constitutional right to privacy as the
basis for striking down a Connecticut statute forbidding the sale and
use of contraceptives. Douglas wrote that:
[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of
privacy. . . . The present case . . . concerns a relationship

44. BLACK, supra note 1, at 15.
45. Id. at 14. In particular, Chief Justice Marshall’s emphasis on the fact that the people in
the states find representation in the national legislature and should not be obligated to rely on the
good faith of state legislatures in which they are not formally represented. See McCulloch, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 428.
46. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411–23.
47. BLACK, supra note 1, at 14.
48. See BOBBITT, supra note 26, at 74–81; Denning & Reynolds, supra note 26, at 1089–
120. In fact, David Schwartz has offered a historical account showing that, while McCulloch was
not particularly influential in establishing nationalist constitutional principles in the first few
decades after its publication, it did embed the essential idea that reading the Constitution requires
something more than clause-bound statutory interpretation techniques. See DAVID S. SCHWARTZ,
THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF
MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (2019).
49. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees.50
David Luban has explained that this passage from Griswold is
amenable to two readings, both structural.51 The first, which he
attributes to Robert Bork,52 understands Douglas to suggest that each
of the textually identified guarantees in the Bill of Rights—the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments—carries with it a
protective “buffer zone” that prophylactically ensures the vitality of
the core right.53 In this reading, these respective buffer zones of
protection then “fuse” into a more general right to privacy.54 This is
structural reasoning, because it derives a broad principle of
constitutional
importance—privacy—from
the
combined
contributions of a number of individual provisions in the written text.
While Bork was willing to accept the constitutional propriety of
recognizing individual zones of protection around each rights
guarantee,55 he criticized Douglas’s approach because he understood
the fusing of these zones into a new general right to privacy, which is
the structural reasoning element here, as an unwarranted additional
step too far removed from the textual provisions of grant or
prohibition that are the source of the claimed constitutional
protection.56 Luban’s alternative reading of the famous language
from Griswold is structural in a different sense. On this account the
right to privacy identified by Justice Douglas was not derived from
the protective zones around each textually specified guarantee but
instead overhangs all of those provisions and is revealed by them,
operating together. Luban explains that “Griswold does not use a
two-step method to construct the right of privacy, with one step
deriving penumbral rights and the next step fusing them, as Bork
suggests.”57 “Griswold’s method,” says Luban, “is instead a Platonic
50. Id. at 484–85 (citation omitted).
51. See David Luban, The Warren Court and the Concept of a Right, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 7 (1999).
52. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL S EDUCTION OF THE
LAW 95–100 (1990).
53. Luban, supra note 51, at 28–29.
54. Id.
55. This is somewhat analogous to reading the Necessary and Proper Clause as confirming
the existence of implied powers created by the express enumerations of power contained in
Article I, Section 8. See infra text accompanying notes 216–20 (discussing this analogous notion).
56. See Luban, supra note 51, at 29.
57. Id. at 36.
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mirror-image of the activist derivation of penumbral rights.”58 That
is, instead of deriving rights penumbral to the specific rights in the
Bill of Rights, Douglas understands each of those textual guarantees
“as itself the penumbra of some principle that allows us to
understand what it is doing in the Constitution.”59 The right to
privacy, then, does not grow out of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Ninth Amendments, but instead informs those specific guarantees
and is revealed by them.60
In his review of Structure and Relationship, which appeared in
the Yale Law Journal several years after the book’s publication,
Professor Vince Blasi noted that attention to constitutional language
plays an important role in Professor Black’s method of reasoning,
just as it does in the dominant approach that Black set up as his
foil.61 Indeed, he makes clear that Black’s method was intended as “a
supplement to, not as a substitute for, the dominant technique of
textual interpretation.”62 Black encouraged a sort of dialogue
between the two interpretive approaches, observing “a close and
perpetual interworking between the textual and the relational and
structural modes of reasoning, for the structure and relations
concerned are themselves created by the text, and inference drawn
from them must surely be controlled by the text.”63 What is
distinctive about Black’s approach is that his textual foundations are
different. “[T]he departure points for [Black’s method of] reasoning
are not the familiar textual passages of grant or prohibition, but
rather other textual passages that recognize political and societal
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Denning & Reynolds, supra note 26, for additional discussion of Griswold as an
example of the Court’s use of structural, or “penumbral,” reasoning. Mark Graber describes this
form of constitutional reasoning as “aspirationalism.” Such arguments, he explains, “are based on
the particular conception of justice underlying the Constitution. . . . Constitutional provisions are
then interpreted and applied in light of these broader constitutional commitments.” MARK A.
GRABER, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 85 (2013). In Graber’s
typography of constitutional arguments, aspirationalism is treated as distinct from structural
reasoning, which “deduce[s] constitutional powers and limitations from the general arrangements
of the constitutional order and the relationships between governing institutions.” Id. at 81. For
present purposes, this Article regards both forms of constitutional reasoning as structural.
61. See Blasi, supra note 14, at 182–84.
62. Id. at 183.
63. BLACK, supra note 1, at 31. “Black is thus protesting not the exclusivity of the textual
mode so much as the ‘stylistic preference’ by which judges—especially twentieth-century
judges—have come to employ the reasoning process of textual interpretation over that of
structural and relational inference.” Blasi, supra note 14, at 180.
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structures and relationships without expressly delineating any rights
and powers that flow therefrom.”64 When we move from individual
rights cases to contested questions about constitutional authority (and
in particular questions about the allocation of power between the
central government and the states), Black’s reliance on structural
features and constitutionally derived institutional relationships may
hold even greater potential to influence the analytic process. The
question is what significance the shift away from provisions of grant
or prohibition might have for the way these issues are framed and
resolved.
B. Concerns About Judicial Discretion
Structure and Relationship was written during the Warren Court
era, and Charles Black embraced that Court’s activism expressly.65
Importantly, however, his activism took a distinct form. While his
reach in identifying the structures and relationships that might
qualify as the basis for constitutional decision making was
reasonably cautious, he was far less restrained in his elaboration of
the inferences that lead from those foundational structures and
relationships to the doctrinal outcomes he urged in individual cases.
This “free-wheeling” and “imaginative” aspect to Black’s
constitutional analysis,66 both in individual rights cases and in
disputes regarding the authority of the federal government,67 invited
a familiar critique, that the adoption of structural reasoning by the
Court would permit the exercise of “excessive judicial discretion.”68

64. Blasi, supra note 14, at 182.
65. Black described himself as a “judicial activist proudly self-confessed.” BLACK, supra
note 1, at 72.
66. Blasi, supra note 14, at 183.
67. A good example of Black’s approach in an individual rights case is his reworking of the
Court’s rationale in Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868), which involved a challenge
to a Nevada tax of a dollar a head on the exit of persons from the state. Black suggested “the fact
that the United States is a single nation warrants inference as to mobility of population, quite
aside from strictly governmental needs.” BLACK, supra note 1, at 27–28. He offered an equally
“free-wheeling” approach to the state action issue presented in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S.
651 (1951), by suggesting that Congress constitutionally ought to have the power “to make
criminal any violent interference, whether by a state or by private persons, with the opinionforming process that gives life to the national polity.” BLACK, supra note 1, at 50.
68. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND
PERSPECTIVES 343 (3d ed. 2007); see also Michael C. Dorf, Interpretive Holism and the
Structural Method, or How Charles Black Might Have Thought About Campaign Finance Reform
and Congressional Timidity, 92 GEO. L.J. 833 (2004) (noting the wide judicial discretion created
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The concern was that the Justices, who were already seen by some to
be using loose inferential reasoning to rationalize predetermined
outcomes in controversial cases, would be further liberated to engage
in even more unrestrained instrumental reasoning once their analyses
were grounded not by express constitutional text but instead by
abstract constructions regarding constitutional structure and
institutional relationship.69
Black offered several responses to this concern. First, he argued
that his approach to constitutional reasoning was no less respectful of
text (and no less liberated from the constraints of text) than the
inferential reasoning from constitutional provisions of grant or
prohibition that the Warren Court often deployed, especially with
respect to constitutional passages of “high generality.”70 Black
explained that “[t]he question is not whether the text shall be
respected, but rather how one goes about respecting a text of that
high generality and consequent ambiguity which marks so many
crucial constitutional texts.”71 Black’s view was that “the generalities
and ambiguities are no greater when one applies the method of
reasoning from structure and relation,”72 precisely because the
structural principles he proposed as analytic anchors reflect genuine
commitments embedded in the American constitutional order and not
transient policy preferences that might ebb or flow with the shifting
membership and political affiliations of the members of the Court.
Indeed, some contemporary advocates of Black’s structural method
have argued that his approach is “perhaps less susceptible to abuse”
than other more familiar interpretive methods, precisely “because it
ties the development of new principles to the overall structure and
purposes of the Constitution.”73
Moreover, Black asserted that reasoning from constitutional
structure and relationship could improve the predictability and clarity
of constitutional doctrine, and serve to introduce a much needed

by structural interpretation); John Harrison, Review of Structure and Relationship in
Constitutional Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1779, 1786 (2003) (book review) (same).
69. See Blasi, supra note 14, at 189.
70. BLACK, supra note 1, at 30–31.
71. Id. at 30.
72. Id. at 30–31.
73. Denning & Reynolds, supra note 26, at 1118 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Glenn H.
Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1333, 1346 (1992)).
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candor to the Court’s work.74 The Court’s analysis, he suggested,
likely would be more empirical and pragmatic and less likely to be
stiffly formalist and removed from the real world interests at stake, if
the question the Court was given to address was not what a particular
clause or constitutional phrase might mean to a careful reader (or
must have meant to one who encountered that text in the late
eighteenth century), but rather what answer to the legal question
would make the most sense in light of the larger constitutional
project. Focusing the Court’s work in this way on the practical
features of a dispute rather than permitting its attention to be diverted
to an often acontextual consideration of language or grammar, might
not diminish uncertainty or drive out doctrinal indeterminacy, but it
could serve to frame disagreements between the Justices or among
advocates so that the interests in conflict, and the relative costs of
selecting one outcome rather than another, would be made more
apparent and thus more amenable to frank evaluation.75
In his lectures, Black pressed this point about transparency and
candor in the course of his discussion of Brewer v. Hoxie School
District No. 46,76 a case about the possible federal constitutional
protections that might attach to actions by state officials
implementing federal rights.77 The facts of the case did not fit neatly
into any familiar constitutional provision setting out specific powers
74. See BLACK, supra note 1, at 31–32.
75. This transparency may on occasion serve as an ameliorative to the problem noted by
Alexander Bickel and others of the claimed counter-majoritarian illegitimacy associated with
constitutional judicial review, see ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962), because it facilitates other actors in the
constitutional system to engage the Court’s work, both through related legislative measures and
executive branch implementation of constitutional norms. Of course, Congress cannot reverse the
Court’s constitutional decisions by ordinary legislation and the executive branch cannot simply
ignore the Court’s prescriptions, but by modifying the sub-constitutional context within which
constitutional doctrine is operationalized, the political branches often can influence the shape and
direction of the broader constitutional regime. For a good discussion of this interactive process,
see LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS
(1988); see also Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993).
On the general idea that the constitutional order operates throughout the various branches and
levels of government, see GRABER, supra note 60, at 103–04, 121–39 (2013). “The pattern of
constitutional authority that has resulted from these complex interactions among elected officials,
political activists, and unelected justices more resembles the chaos of the local garage band than
the precision of a Mozart symphony.” Id. at 103.
76. 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
77. Id. at 91. The plaintiffs in this case were members of a local school board in Hoxie,
Arkansas who were attempting to implement a policy to desegregate the local public schools.
They sued in federal district court for injunctive relief against the defendants, who were seeking
to interfere with the operation of the Hoxie schools on a desegregated basis. Id. at 93–94.
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or prohibitions, but Professor Black offered a structural rationale for
the federal appeals court’s holding for the state officials, suggesting
that the outcome ought to turn on a general understanding of the
federal-state relationship and not on any specific clause or phrase in
the constitution.78 Directing his attention to the value of judicial
candor, Black observed:
I think this an eminently sensible implication. You may not
think so. If you do not, then we can and must begin to argue
at once about the practicalities and proprieties of the thing,
without getting out dictionaries whose entries will not really
respond to the question we are putting, or scanning
utterances, contemporary with the text, of persons who did
not really face the question we are asking. We will have to
deal with policy and not with grammar. I am not saying that
grammar can be sidestepped, or that policy can legitimately
be the whole of law. I am only saying that where a fairly
available method of legal reasoning, by its very nature,
leads directly to the discussion of practical rightness, that
method should be used whenever possible.79
Two additional considerations help to shore up Black’s response
to the critics of his interpretive approach. Neither is expressly set out
in Structure and Relationship or in Black’s other published work on
the subject, but both are clearly implied. The first is that the adoption
of a structural approach, because it tends to reframe constitutional
disputes into questions about the operation of governmental and
other societal systems, has the potential to broaden the information
that litigants are likely to bring to the adjudicative process and to
broaden the perspective of the judges charged with evaluating the
resulting claims. As Vince Blasi has explained: “To the extent that
structural reasoning would result in a refashioning of lawsuits, with
different information coming to the attention of judges,” the
approach “may well lead to judicial intuitions and preconceptions
that can be considered to be more sophisticated and thereby, quite
apart from the subjective desirability of the results that might ensue,
improvements of ‘process.’”80 A reliance on specific sections and
78.
79.
80.
a much

See BLACK, supra note 1, at 17–19, 22.
Id. at 22–23.
Blasi, supra note 14, at 189–90. Blasi also notes that “the structural approach recognizes
broader, more comprehensive set of constitutional norms,” and thus “may facilitate a
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clauses of constitutional text concerned with authorizing action or
limiting authority necessarily pushes courts to evaluate constitutional
claims in isolation one from another. “The complex, integrated
injustices of the current age,” however, “do not fit easily into the
pigeonholes of specific grants and prohibitions” and do not lend
themselves to effective resolution solely through the elaboration of
that species of constitutional language.81
C. Demonstrating Fidelity to the Written Constitution by Attending
to Structures and Institutional Relationships
The final consideration operating in favor of Professor Black’s
method of reasoning from structure and relationship sounds not as a
pragmatic ground for adoption of his approach but as a ground based
in principle, capable of contributing to the overall legitimacy of the
system of judicial review. At least as conceived by Black, the
structures and relationships that form the basis for his analysis derive
in some demonstrable fashion from the “sovereign act of will,” and
the resulting writing, by which the constitution was established and
brought into effect through ratification.82 Difficult questions of
“fidelity” necessarily arise whenever a contemporary approach to
interpretation seeks some measure of grounding in the original
founding of the constitutional order. If the obligations and
prohibitions of the original written Constitution are taken to have
express, specific, and literal ongoing force, the problem of the “dead
hand”—the uncertain moral and political authority of a past group of
decision makers to control the democratic choices of the present—
judicial response to citizen complaints that concern systemic shortcomings as well as those that
involve particularized grievances.” Id. at 186.
81. Id. at 187. An article published in the run up to the Supreme Court’s decision in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), in which the Court
evaluated the constitutionality of the “individual mandate” provision of the Affordable Care Act
of 2010, serves as a helpful example of the kind of information that can become relevant once a
structural approach to constitutional interpretation is employed, but that might not be regarded by
the Court as relevant in a more traditional interpretive model. In the article, Professors Leslie
Meltzer Henry and Maxwell Stearns employ game theory to demonstrate in some detail why a
state-level approach to regulating the health insurance market is bound to fail and thus why, on an
incompetence of the individual states rationale, the federal government ought to be empowered to
intervene in this national market. See Leslie Meltzer Henry & Maxwell L. Stearns, Commerce
Games and the Individual Mandate, 100 GEO L.J. 1117 (2012). For additional discussion of
Sebelius and the Meltzer Henry and Stearns’s article, see infra text accompanying notes 262–64.
82. Blasi, supra note 14, at 192; see also RAKOVE, supra note 15, at 11 (reminding that it
was the Constitution as a whole and not its parts that was presented to the states and that was
ratified).

(6) 54.3_BOLDT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

6/20/21 2:36 PM

REVISITING CHARLES BLACK’S WHITE LECTURES

695

necessarily must be confronted.83 If, on the other hand, these
formative commitments are treated not as literal or static, or
conveyed directly in the Constitution’s passages of grant and
prohibition, but instead are found more generally in the
Constitution’s broadly embedded values and institutional
arrangements, “whose meaning and context evolve over time,”84 then
constitutional interpretation becomes a task of construction as much
as discovery, a task that the Founders (and state ratifying
conventions) can be understood to have delegated to future actors,
including succeeding generations of judges hearing constitutional
claims. By this account, constitutional reasoning by inference from
structure and relationship is neither freed entirely from the
constraints of the decisions entered at the founding nor burdened
completely by the literal terms of grant and prohibition contained in
the original master text. Constitutional meaning is instead an
amalgam of original design harmonized with ongoing reinvention
and reinterpretation by contemporary actors operating within a
constitutional tradition that each generation must remake and
reauthorize on its own terms.85 To be sure, the constitutional tradition
in the United States is centered around a written text. From one
perspective, this fact clearly distinguishes the American
constitutional order from other constitutional systems based on an
“unwritten” or “uncodified” constitution.86 In constitutional systems
without a written text, foundational authority is said to be located
“not in a spontaneous act of autonomous sovereign will but in a
living discursive tradition of historical legal thought and practice

83. See Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 381–83 (1997).
84. Blasi, supra note 14, at 192.
85. One version of this dynamic process of constitutional (re)construction is the theory of
constitutional “translation” suggested by Lawrence Lessig. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in
Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1171 n.32 (1993). Jack Balkin’s proposed “method of text
and principle,” which conceives the task of interpretation as “look[ing] to original meaning and
underlying principle and decid[ing] how best to apply them in current circumstances,” is also
applicable. See Balkin, supra note 29, at 293.
86. Danchin, supra note 29, at 35. On this account, the U.S. Constitution is “understood to
be the result of an exceptional act of popular self-determination” and functions as a “master-text
[that] is the expression of a super-majoritarian act of popular will.” Id. at 37. “We have a sacred
text—the Constitution—which we understand as the revelatory expression of the popular
sovereign.” Paul W. Kahn, Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the
New International Order, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2000). The role of the judiciary in this textcentric system, in turn, is “to articulate the meaning of the canonical constitutional master-text
which is itself a ‘remnant’ of popular sovereignty.” Danchin, supra note 29, at 38.
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which precedes and shapes acts of sovereign will.”87 Inherent in this
distinction between written and unwritten constitutions is an
embedded set of ideas about the normative basis of constitutional
obligation.88 Written constitutions command fidelity because of their
origins, while unwritten constitutions have normative force because
of their past reception and the ongoing engagement of “law-applying
officials” with that tradition.89 From this point of view, the job of a
constitutional court in a system with a written constitution is to
interrogate the written text, perhaps giving special significance to its
original meaning, so as to effectuate the commitments that the
sovereign people set at the moment of ratification.90 In a
constitutional system without a written constitution, by contrast, the
judicial function is to nurture the “living discursive tradition,”
essentially facilitating a “partnership among ‘those who are living,
those who are dead, and those who will be born.’”91
It is possible, however, in considering the American
constitutional order, to view both the question of constitutional
normativity (the question of fidelity to an original set of
constitutional commitments, reflected in a text made by an act of
sovereign will at the founding) and the question of judicial function
(the Court’s disposition toward the written text) in a way that
borrows helpfully from the tradition of unwritten constitutionalism
and that narrows somewhat the distinction between the operation of a
written and an unwritten constitution. As Charles Black helpfully
suggested, the entrenched obligations that derive from an original act
of sovereign will may be structural and relational as much as they are
directive and prohibitory.92 The commitments of the founding to
which ongoing generations owe fidelity are those foundational
arrangements that have endured and have been embraced, refined,
and re-enacted over the long life of the constitutional regime. In that
sense, the normative force of the written constitution, including the
institutions and structures woven into its whole text, derives from its
87. Danchin, supra note 29, at 36.
88. For one influential view of the relationship between written and unwritten constitutional
authority, see Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
211 (1988).
89. Danchin, supra note 29, at 49.
90. Id. at 51.
91. Id. at 36.
92. See BLACK, supra note 1, at 30–31.
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original history together with its long and useful tenure.93 It is, as
with the unwritten British constitution, a “partnership among ‘those
who are living, those who are dead, and those who will be born.’”94
The judicial function under a written constitution, then, need not be
narrowly hermeneutical. Charles Black’s work on structure and
relationship is not a repudiation of the importance of constitutional
text, but a call to refocus the interpretive task to engage the text more
holistically and to redirect the Court’s attention from narrow
provisions of grant and prohibition to a broader consideration, when
appropriate, of the Constitution’s foundational structuring
language.95
PART II
A. The Constitutional Convention and the Question of Federalism
When the delegates to the Constitutional Convention arrived in
Philadelphia in the early summer of 1787, they faced a threshold
question, how to designate the essential character and authority of
the central government relative to the states. One possibility was to
depart substantially from the design of the Articles of Confederation
and adopt a scheme in which the states would be reduced to “the
position of municipal corporations confined to the area of local selfgovernment” while the legislature of the central government would
be authorized to exercise general lawmaking powers.96 Alexander
Hamilton apparently favored this position, although his plan was
never formally presented to the body.97 A somewhat more measured
version was prepared by Edmund Randolph, James Madison, and
others in the Virginia delegation.98 This Virginia Plan framed early
discussion in the Convention and set the agenda for much of the
participants’ work.99
On the other side were proposals to retain a confederation of
relatively powerful quasi-sovereign states, but to identify specific
93. Danchin, supra note 29, at 36.
94. Id.
95. See BLACK, supra note 1.
96. Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in
Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 432 (1941).
97. See id. at 433.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 433, 436–37.
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new powers, beyond those recognized in the Articles, to be given the
central government in order to respond directly to the perceived
failings of the then-existing arrangements.100 Under these proposals,
the states would be designated as “constituent members of a federal
system,” and the central government’s power, although augmented in
expressly designated areas, would remain significantly circumscribed
in most others.101 Charles Pinckney of South Carolina and William
Paterson of New Jersey offered proposals that reflected this
perspective.102 Paterson’s plan was given careful consideration by
the Delegates, but was not adopted.103
At the heart of the constitutional system that ultimately emerged
from the work of the Convention is a central government of limited
but superior authority and individual states designated as repositories
of residual authority. Notwithstanding the relative clarity of these
essential structural features, a good deal of uncertainty attended (and
continues to attend) the task of determining how to delineate the
boundaries of the federal government’s superior authority (and of
determining whether and to what extent that authority should be
exclusive or concurrently shared with the states). The historical
record shows that the delegates’ deliberations occurred in several
discrete stages. First, proceeding as a “committee of the whole” they
worked through a series of proposals, including those contained in
the Virginia Plan and the New Jersey Plan, to determine which to
retain on their agenda for more formal action by the Convention.104
Next, the delegates returned systematically to the items they had
approved as a committee of the whole, entertaining amendments and
revisions, for the purpose of determining the measures they wished
to forward to a “committee of detail.”105 Finally, following a return
100. See id. at 433–34. Edmund Randolph offered the Convention a catalogue of the primary
defects the country had experienced under the Articles of Confederation. They included, among
others: “that the confederation produced no security against foreign invasion”; “that the federal
government could not check the quarrels between states”; and “that the federal government could
not defend itself against the incroachments from the states.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 19 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 1].
101. Abel, supra note 96, at 433.
102. See id. at 433, 434–35; see also THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 1,
supra note 100, at 242.
103. See Abel, supra note 96, at 437; see also THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,
VOL. 1, supra note 100, at 33.
104. See Abel, supra note 96, at 436–37.
105. See id. at 437.
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by the committee of detail later in the summer of 1787, the
Convention debated that group’s working draft and, with
amendments and substitutions, finally approved the version of the
constitution that was presented for ratification.106 At each of these
stages of the decision-making process, the record makes clear that
some delegates favored a broad delegation of power to the central
government (the position initially set out in the Virginia Plan) and
others supported strictly enumerated limits on that authority (the
view of Paterson and Pinckney). There are also formal markers
indicating where the weight of opinion on this question stood at each
critical juncture in the process.107 These data points are difficult to
align into a simple narrative in favor of one of the competing
positions or the other; instead, they suggest a more complicated story
about how to understand the nature of the federalist system that
emerged from this process.
i. Conceptual Framing by the Committee of the Whole and the
Convention Prior to the Referral to the Committee of Detail
The initial deliberations of the committee of the whole, which
commenced on May 29, 1787, were organized around the Virginia
Plan, presented to the Convention by Edmund Randolph.108 On the
question of the lawmaking authority of the central government, the
Virginians’ proposal was that
the National Legislature ought to be [e]mpowered to enjoy
the [l]egislative [r]ights vested in Congress by the
Confederation [and] moreover to legislate in all cases to
which the separate [s]tates are incompetent, or in which the
harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the
exercise of individual Legislation . . . .109
According to Madison’s Notes,110 several delegates from South
Carolina (Pinckney, Rutledge, and Butler) raised objections to the

106. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 2, supra note 22, at 176–89.
107. See Abel, supra note 96, at 436–38.
108. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 1, supra note 100, at 18–23
(Madison’s Notes).
109. Id. at 21.
110. In her book Madison’s Hand, Mary Sarah Bilder describes how Madison revised his
Notes in the years following the Convention by making substantial revisions, additions, and
deletions to the text. Bilder’s work reminds us that Madison’s Notes reflect not simply his
impressions at the Convention but also his evolving perspective on the work of the founding over
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“vagueness” of the individual state incompetence standard for
delineating federal lawmaking power and suggested that they could
not support it “until they should see an exact enumeration of the
powers comprehended by this definition.”111 Madison expressed a
“bias in favor of an enemeration [sic]” but also identified “doubts
concerning its practicability.”112 Randolph “disclaimed any intention
to give indefinite powers to the national Legislature,”
notwithstanding the articulation of a state incompetence standard
rather than a precise enumeration of federal legislative powers.113
After considerable discussion, on May 31, 1787, the committee of
the whole, voting by state, determined to advance the state
incompetence formulation for further action by the Convention.114
The vote was nine states in favor, one state (Connecticut) divided,
and none opposed.115 The committee of the whole also voted, in this
case unanimously, in favor of the additional provision in the Virginia
Plan that would empower the national legislature to act when “the
harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of
individual Legislation.”116
In mid-June of 1787, the committee of the whole, having
completed its initial favorable review of the Virginia Plan, turned its
attention to the alternative proposals that had been prepared by
William Paterson of New Jersey, apparently in consultation with
delegates from several other smaller states.117 After extensive
discussions, the delegates rejected the New Jersey plan, “adhering to
that of Randolph as the foundation for further action.”118 By midJuly, the delegates had reached the second stage of their process, in
which they were now proceeding as a “convention as such.”119 The
focus at this stage was to consider the proposals that the committee
of the whole had placed on the agenda, for approval by the
time. See MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 49 (2015).
111. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 1, supra note 100, at 53.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 53–54.
115. Id. at 47.
116. Id.
117. Abel, supra note 96, at 437.
118. Id.; see also THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 1, supra note 100, at
313.
119. Abel, supra note 96, at 437.
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Convention and consequent referral to a committee of detail.120
When the discussion turned to the powers of the national legislature,
Roger Sherman of Connecticut offered substitute language for that
which had been approved in May by the committee of the whole.121
Sherman suggested that the legislature of the central government
ought to be empowered “in all cases which may concern the common
interests of the Union; but not to interfere with the [g]overnment of
the individual [s]tates in any matters of internal police . . . wherein
the [g]eneral welfare of the U[nited] States is not concerned.”122 This
proposal was rejected by a vote of eight states to two,123 and, on
July 17, 1787, the Convention formally approved language,
submitted by Gunning Bedford of Delaware, conferring on the new
federal Congress legislative powers “in all cases for the general
interest of the Union, and also in those to which the states are
separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the U[nited]
States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual
[l]egislation.”124 The vote, again, was eight states in favor and two
opposed.125
ii. The Committee of Detail’s Enumerations Approach
On July 24, 1787, the Convention delegated to a “committee of
detail” the task of developing a draft document “conformable to the
Resolutions passed by the Convention.”126 In early August of that
year, the committee of detail returned a “report” which included an
enumeration of powers to be accorded the new legislature of the
federal government.127 This enumeration, as modified and
renumbered, formed the basis for Article I, Section 8 of the final
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 2, supra note 22, at 25.
123. See id. at 26.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 27; see Abel, supra note 96, at 435–36. The debate between proponents of a
broad state incompetence formula and those who supported a more restrictive allocation of
authority to the central government intersected a second debate, between delegates from the
larger states who favored using population to determine representation in the legislature and those
from smaller states who sought equal representation. In July of 1787, after the delegates had
settled on a compromise under which there would be equal representation in the Senate, some
delegates from smaller states, notably including Bedford of Delaware, turned their support in
favor of the broad state incompetence approach, while others from larger states, including
Randolph, cooled on the idea.
126. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 2, supra note 22, at 106.
127. See id. at 181–82.
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version of the constitution approved by the Convention and
ultimately ratified by the requisite number of state conventions.
Significantly, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 provides that Congress
shall have the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”128 Article
I, Section 8, Clause 18 states that Congress shall have the power
“[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.”129
A leading constitutional law casebook has framed discussion of
this history in the following way:
It is evident . . . that questions of large import are presented
by the shift from a general and loosely-phrased grant of
power to the national government, which the Convention
initially approved on May 31 and July 17, to the itemized
list of national powers embodied in the August 6 report of
the Committee of Detail. Consideration should be given to
two conflicting interpretations: (a) The enumeration by the
Committee of Detail, which the Convention employed as a
basis for final action, should be construed to reach towards
the same generalized grant of power to the national
government which the Convention had earlier approved; (b)
The decision to enumerate the powers of Congress reflects a
decision sharply to circumscribe national power.130
Not infrequently, these “two conflicting interpretations” have
been identified by justices on the Supreme Court, in majority
opinions and dissents, as the framework within which to think
through federalism questions, and in particular questions about the
reach of the Interstate Commerce power held by Congress.131 On one
side are Commerce Clause opinions from the late nineteenth century
through the mid-1930s, as well as significant decisions from United

128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
129. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
130. VARAT & AMAR, supra note 25, at 107.
131. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (highlighting the
contrasting positions taken in the controlling opinion of Chief Justice Roberts and the dissenting
opinion of Justice Ginsburg). For further discussion of these distinct positions, see infra text
accompanying notes 243–63.
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States v. Lopez132 forward, in which the Court’s majority has relied
on a variety of formalist interpretations of the enumerative language
in Article I, Section 8 to provide strict judicially enforceable
limitations on the ability of Congress to regulate matters traditionally
regarded as within the warrant of the states’ police powers.133 On the
other side is an unbroken string of Commerce Clause decisions from
the late 1930s until the mid-1990s, as well as forceful dissents in
more recent cases, in which the justices adopted a practical,
pragmatic approach to the question of federal powers, relying not on
the literal terms of the enumeration but rather on an updated version
of the Virginia Plan’s notion that Congress should be free to
intervene in all matters about which “the States are separately
incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be
interrupted.”134
iii. Reconciling the Competing Narratives
While understanding the promulgation history of the Commerce
Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the other provisions in
Article I, Section 8 within the framework of these two competing
narratives—two narratives that also appear to mark out the wavering
and uncertain path of the Supreme Court’s federalism
132. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
133. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lopez contains a good overview of this history.
See id. at 568–73. In United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), the Court misapplied
earlier cases involving the constitutionality of state laws, see, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1,
20 (1888), to support a formalist distinction between productive activities such as manufacture,
agriculture, and mining and commercial activities subject to Commerce Clause authority. In this
period prior to the Court Packing Plan, the Supreme Court also deployed a formalist directindirect test to limit federal regulatory authority. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238,
309–10 (1936). In Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Court’s
majority revived this formalist tradition by drawing a distinction between economic and
noneconomic activities and by reinventing the direct-indirect test as a causation requirement that
prohibits Congress from “pil[ing] inference upon inference” in order to show that a regulated
activity substantially affects interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
134. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 1, supra note 100, at 21; see, e.g.,
Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937) (“In view of
respondent’s far-flung activities, it is idle to say that the effect would be indirect or remote. . . .
We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national life and to deal with the
question of direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum.”); see also United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (recognizing the incapacity of individual states to manage because of
a regulatory race to the bottom); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (recognizing the
practical empirical effects of home-grown commodities on the vitality of national markets). A
similar anti-formalist approach is apparent in dissenting opinions in more recent Commerce
Clause cases. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 641–43, 655 (Souter, J., dissenting); Sebelius, 567
U.S. at 589, 601–04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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jurisprudence—is sensible, a closer look at the work of the
Convention history suggests a third slight variation instead. This
alternative perspective, in turn, invites a reconsideration of Charles
Black’s method of reasoning from structure and relationship in the
context of Commerce Clause disputes and other federalism matters,
by placing the Constitution’s narrow textual passages of grant and
prohibition into an analytic context that brings into view the broader
commitments embedded in the whole Constitution.
Albert Abel, a constitutional law scholar writing in the early
1940s, offered a helpful account of the decision-making process by
which the delegates to the Constitutional Convention moved from
approval of a broad state incompetence standard to adoption of the
enumerations approach that found its way into the final document.135
Crucially, after consulting the available historical evidence in
considerable detail, Abel concluded that the decision of the delegates
to adopt a version of the itemized list of powers developed by the
committee of detail did not represent a shift from, or repudiation of,
their earlier endorsement of a broad standard for federal legislative
authority, nor was their adoption of the enumerations language
intended simply to be absorbed into that previously approved
standard.136 Rather, their intention was to describe the boundaries of
the newly reconceived central government “within the double
limitation of standard and item.”137 The “standard” embraced by the
Convention delegates (avoiding state incompetence and promoting
the harmony of the United States) and the “items” approach they
endorsed (the enumerations set out in Article I, Section 8) each
performed a distinct function in the design of the constitutional order
they devised.
For Abel’s account to be coherent, we must understand
constitutional text to operate at two levels. The individual passages
of grant and prohibition, including most importantly, the enumerated
powers of the federal legislature set out in Article 1, Section 8, do
135. See Abel, supra note 96, at 438–40.
136. Id. at 438 (noting that the delegates “had twice approved” the state incompetence
standard, “once as a committee of the whole and once as a convention” and had rejected twice,
“once tacitly, in ignoring the Pinckney plan, and again expressly, in their disposition of the
Patterson proposals,” a straightforward enumerations approach “unaccompanied by a declaration
of standards appropriate for the determination of their scope and reach”).
137. Id. at 440 (“The sense of the convention seems clear enough. The evident purpose was to
give power over neither a congeries of independent unrelated subjects, nor yet over some misty
and uncertain area of undefined extent . . . .”).
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important work in conveying the Convention’s understanding of the
role they expected Congress to play in the newly revised federalist
system.138 But the broader sweep of constitutional text, including
provisions creating the very institutions of the central government,
providing for the election of incumbents in the political branches and
the selection of judicial officers for the federal courts, situating these
institutions one to another and to their coordinate partners in the
governments of the states—the textual sources from which Professor
Black derived the foundations for his reasoning from structure and
relationship—also play a key role in shaping American constitutional
federalism.139 In essence, the delegates likely understood that their
early work operating as a committee of the whole, and their
somewhat later deliberations prior to their referral to the committee
of detail, was the work of conceptual framing, of creating the
constitutional structures and relationships that would serve to ground
later, more specific efforts, reflected in other more directive
provisions of grant and prohibition.140 In late May through mid-July
of 1787, the Convention participants were building the foundations
and framing out the structure of the constitutional house they were
building.141 The work of the committee of detail and its subsequent
adoption by the Convention later that summer was, in effect, the
application of bricks and shingles onto the structure to which they
had already committed themselves, not its repudiation.142
The creation of essential structures and relationships, conveyed
by the broad sweep of constitutional language, was the Convention’s
effort to embed permanently the fundamental values and
commitments that support the American constitutional order. The
enumeration of powers in Article I, derived from the report of the
committee of detail, as well as the articulation of other provisions of
grant and prohibition elsewhere in the document, represented the
delegates’ best understanding of how those fundamental

138. See id. at 439.
139. See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: The Myth and Reality of Federalism, 9
UNIV. TOL. L. REV. 615, 617 (1978) (discussing that the unique allocation of power between the
federal government and the states means that “American federalism is non-exportable”); Charles
L. Black, Jr., On Worrying About the Constitution, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 469, 470 (1984)
(discussing the worry that government powers have become too broad).
140. See Abel, supra note 96, at 439; see also RAKOVE, supra note 15.
141. Abel, supra note 96, at 436–37.
142. See id. at 439–40.
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commitments would be operationalized for the then-foreseeable
future.143 There is good reason to treat as legitimate the fundamental
values—the commitment to institutional arrangement and to essential
constitutional structure—that the Framers put in place at the
Convention. Those values and institutional arrangements have
largely endured over the many decades of our constitutional history
and have been embraced by succeeding generations.144 Some of the
more specific provisions of grant and prohibition have also worn
well over time and thus remain vibrant markers for purposes of
constitutional decision making today.145 But others clearly have
fallen out of alignment with the underlying economic, social,
cultural, and political context within which the Constitution must
operate. In those instances, the deeper structures and relationships
that ground constitutional practice should predominate and the
precise textual mandate of the individual constitutional passages that
no longer fit the needs of the polity should not.
B. The Interstate Commerce Clause and the Framers’
Miscalculation
Importantly, the Interstate Commerce Clause,146 the enumerated
power that has proven the most fertile source of federal government
power over the years, may be the best example of an individual
provision of grant and prohibition whose original conception is most
divergent from contemporary understandings and from the needs of
contemporary society and twenty-first century economic realities.
Once again, Professor Abel’s canvassing of the historical record
provides a rich picture of the intentions and expectations of the
143. See id.
144. See Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1067–69
(1981) (“Judges, or others who wish to appeal to the Constitution, must demonstrate that the
principles upon which they propose to confer constitutional status express values that our society
does hold to be fundamental. One way in which that can be done is by showing that those values
are rooted in history, that they are not merely the result of the interests or passions of the
moment.”); cf. JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF
GOVERNMENT (2001) (arguing that a constitution is the institution by which a people holds itself
to its fundamental political commitments over time). But see SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE
PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006) (presenting a sustained argument that essential constitutional
structures and institutional arrangements have proven dysfunctional and should be replaced).
145. Some examples include the Foreign Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3., the
provision governing the creation of federal bankruptcy law, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4., and the
provision creating the basis for intellectual property law, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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delegates to the Convention of 1787 with respect to the enumerated
power to regulate commerce “among the several states,” and
demonstrates how far removed from that original understanding we
find ourselves today.147 That the original conception of the Interstate
Commerce Clause is so far removed from our contemporary reality is
reason enough to relax reliance on that specific text as the basis for
determining federal regulatory powers now and in the foreseeable
future and instead to consult Professor Black’s reasoning from
structure and relationship as a superior methodology for making
federalism decisions. On this question of assigning domestic
regulatory authority to the federal government, the Framers’
expectations have not been borne out by subsequent developments.
But their broader foundational work, reflected in essential
constitutional structures and relationships, remains relevant to the
task, and indeed provides the basis for ongoing development in this
area.
The Framers clearly did not expect the Interstate Commerce
Clause to be a general source of legislative authority governing
economic activity within and between the states.148 Instead, they
intended this provision to serve merely a “negative and preventive”
function, to limit the effects of commercial competition between the
states.149 By contrast, the delegates to the Convention envisioned the
Foreign Commerce Clause as potentially a broad grant of affirmative
power to the new national legislature, and expected that this
enumerated power would support significant regulatory activity.150
Abel points out that, unlike the regulation of foreign commerce,
which was debated at length by the delegates, control by the central
government over commercial activity between the states “seems to
have been mentioned only nine times” during the Convention’s
formal deliberations.151 More importantly, on all nine of these
occasions, the delegates’ focus was on ensuring that the new national
legislature would be able to enact measures to prevent or ameliorate
the obstructive effects of state regulations, tariffs, or exactions on

147. See Abel, supra note 96, at 465–81.
148. See id. at 472.
149. Id. at 469 (quoting Letter from James Madison to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 3 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
150. See id. at 468–69.
151. Id. at 470.

(6) 54.3_BOLDT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

708

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

6/20/21 2:36 PM

[Vol. 54:675

commerce across state lines.152 Not once was the “grant of power
over commerce between the states . . . advanced as the basis for
independent affirmative regulation by the federal government.”153
Indeed, while modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence treats the
regulation of “instrumentalities” of domestic commerce as a
quintessential subject matter for federal government regulation,154
the Framers’ discussions regarding the development (and protection)
of internal waterways, harbors, roads, bridges, and the like
“uniformly assumed that control over such transportation facilities
was to remain with the states, and not to be devolved upon the
general government. No more was claimed for the commerce clause
than that it might prevent states through which interstate streams ran
from levying toll for their use.”155
The Framers’ intention, that the Interstate Commerce Clause
would play a “purely negative function of vetoing state-imposed
barriers . . . to interstate trade,” and that it was at best a provision
ancillary to the Foreign Commerce power, fairly quickly proved to
be a miscalculation.156 This miscalculation inhered principally in the
inability of the original parsimonious conception of the domestic
commerce power to accomplish the broader goal the Framers also
had adopted, which was to empower the central government to
promote the harmony of the Union by legislating when the states
individually were incompetent. In a series of decisions from Gibbons
v. Ogden157 forward, the Supreme Court reconceived the Interstate
Commerce Clause to provide a range of affirmative legislative
powers to the federal government.158 Of course, the scope of this
judicial reworking has been subject to considerable dispute from the
152. See id. at 470–71.
153. See id. at 471. As further evidence of the extremely limited scope that the delegates
imagined for the Interstate Commerce Clause, Abel notes that most matters affecting the flow of
commerce between the states were debated in isolation from the Commerce Clause and generally
were made subject to separate provisions in the constitutional text. Thus, Congress was separately
given the power to coin money and to punish counterfeiting, and independent provisions were
directed toward prohibiting the impairment of contract by states and providing a federal judicial
forum for inter-state commercial disputes by way of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 476–78.
154. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
155. Abel, supra note 96, at 478.
156. Id. at 480–81.
157. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
158. Abel, supra note 96, at 480 (“For the first thirty years of its life the commerce clause was
lost in silence, and since then it has been lost in words. It has not been missed, however, for the
courts have supplied a fine large substitute; whereas the original now turns out to have been so
small that it was naturally hard to keep track of.”).
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very start and remains a source of vexatious contest moving
forward.159 But overhanging this judicial project of reconstruction
has been a broad constitutional commitment to ensuring that the
federal government is equipped to manage challenges of public
policy that are beyond the ken of the states when acting in their
individual capacities. The methodological point put by Charles Black
in his White Lectures goes to the persistence of this broad
constitutional commitment, embedded in the constitution’s essential
structures and relationships.160 In Black’s account, significant
advantages, in achieving doctrinal clarity and candor, are available
when the interpretive project is centered not on constitutional
provisions of grant and prohibition that are misaligned with
America’s fundamental constitutional structures and relationships,
but on those structures and relationships themselves.161
PART III
If the Supreme Court were to take up Professor Black’s
invitation to consider reasoning from structure and relationship in at
least some disputes involving federal authority, and if lower federal
courts and state courts followed that lead, the importance assigned to
the highly stylized parsing of narrow constitutional text would
diminish.162 Disagreements over what constitutes “commerce” (or
“economic activity”), for example, could be deemphasized in favor
of more productive deliberations over the relative advantages and
disadvantages of relying on federal interventions to address difficult
problems of public concern, particularly when those problems

159. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
160. See generally BLACK, supra note 1.
161. Id. at 22–23.
162. Blasi, supra note 14, at 183 (noting that it is important to emphasize that Black’s method
of reasoning contemplates a role for textual analysis and was intended “as a supplement to, not as
a substitute for, the dominant technique of textual interpretation”); see also supra text
accompanying notes 61–63. Given the economic consequences of virtually all activity potentially
subject to federal regulation, however, a commerce clause jurisprudence reliant primarily on the
close parsing of terms such as “commerce” and “economic activity” is not likely to be effective in
delineating the boundaries of the federalist system. In the case of the Interstate Commerce Clause,
the logic of Professor Black’s approach pushes toward a consideration of the broader structural
components of the written constitution and away from narrow bits of text derived from the
specific enumerated power.
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present intractable coordination difficulties for individual states.163
Under a judicial regime that seriously entertained Black’s method of
constitutional interpretation, legitimate disagreements about how
best to calibrate the balance of American federalism would be more
transparently addressed, and proxy fights waged through stylized
arguments over narrow text could be avoided.164
In addition, adoption of Black’s interpretive method would
significantly recast the Court’s treatment of the Necessary and
Proper Clause. On occasion, the Court has relied on the Necessary
and Proper Clause as a tool for extending the legislative authority of
Congress beyond the boundaries thought to be set by the enumerated
powers that precede it.165 The Justices in these cases treat the
Necessary and Proper Clause as “granting” powers to Congress
beyond those conveyed by the other enumerated provisions.166 On
163. On the Commerce Clause and problems of state coordination, see Maxwell L. Stearns,
Constitutional Law’s Conflicting Premises, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (2020) [hereinafter
Conflicting Premises] and Maxwell L. Stearns, The New Commerce Clause Doctrine in Game
Theoretical Perspective, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Game Theoretical Perspective].
In his dissent in Morrison, Justice Breyer observes that “[w]e live in a Nation knit together by
two centuries of scientific, technological, commercial, and environmental change. Those changes,
taken together, mean that virtually every kind of activity, no matter how local, genuinely can
affect commerce, or its conditions, outside the State—at least when considered in the aggregate.
And that fact makes it close to impossible for courts to develop meaningful subject-matter
categories . . . .” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 660 (citation omitted).
164. This perspective is consistent with Hamilton’s position in Federalist 23 and 31. See THE
FEDERALIST NOS. 23, 31, at 123–26, 165–68 (Alexander Hamilton). In Federalist 23, for
example, Hamilton asserts:
[T]he adversaries of the plan promulgated by the convention would have given a better
impression of their candor if they had confined themselves to showing that the internal
structure of the proposed government was such as to render it unworthy of the
confidence of the people. They ought not to have wandered into inflammatory
declamations and unmeaning cavils about the extent of the powers.
Id. at 126.
In Federalist 31, Hamilton concludes his discussion by observing;
[I]t is by far the safest course to . . . confine our attention wholly to the nature and
extent of the powers as they are delineated in the Constitution. Everything beyond this
must be left to the prudence and firmness of the people; who, as they will hold the
scales in their own hands, it is to be hoped will always take care to preserve the
constitutional equilibrium between the general and the State governments.
Id. at 168.
165. See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) (explaining that Congress has
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to prevent public corruption that undermines its
exercise of authority under the Spending Clause).
166. See id.; see also United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133–34 (2010) (“[T]he
Necessary and Proper Clause makes clear that the Constitution’s grants of specific federal
legislative authority are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, or
useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’”).
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the other side, some of the Justices have looked to the Necessary and
Proper Clause as the textual basis for limiting Congressional
undertakings, particularly by holding that the challenged legislation
is not “proper.”167 Taken together, these cases, some pushing in favor
and some against Congressional authority, have prompted a renewed
academic discussion about how to properly interpret the Necessary
and Proper Clause.168
A. The New Structuralism and the Renewed Debate Over the
Necessary and Proper Clause
Professor John Manning, in his 2014 Harvard Law Review
Foreword, has characterized the reasoning of the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts with respect to the Necessary and Proper Clause as a
“new structuralism,” and has linked this contemporary form of
structuralism to the interpretive approach set out in Charles Black’s
work.169 While an accurate account of the current Court’s cases, this
is a misreading of Black.
On one hand, Manning argues that the post-New Deal Supreme
Court “treated the Necessary and Proper Clause as a broad source of
congressional authority,” and consequently accorded significant
deference to Congressional decisions.170 By contrast, he understands
the new structuralism of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts to have
“transform[ed] the Necessary and Proper Clause into a delegation of
power to the courts to define abstract structural policies.”171 Manning
is troubled by this interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
which he regards instead as a “master provision” directed
specifically to Congress and conveying a clear delegation of
discretion to that body “to compose the government and prescribe the
means of constitutional power.”172
167. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997); see also Gary Lawson &
Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the
Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 297–333 (1993) (urging the Court to read federalism limits
into the term “proper” in the Necessary and Proper Clause); Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow
Powers of Article I, 123 YALE L.J. 2044, 2068–81 (2014) (observing that the Court has used the
Necessary and Proper Clause in some recent cases to limit Congress’s power).
168. See Baude, supra note 11; Beck, supra note 4, Barnett, supra note 4; Manning, supra
note 13.
169. Manning, supra note 11, at 30–32.
170. Id. at 6.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 6–7.
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Professor Black’s method of reasoning from structure and
relationship, while consistent with the post-New Deal Court’s
approach in cases involving federal power, has less to do with the
new structuralism of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. Cases
purporting to use structural reasoning to support an expansion of
state sovereign immunity under (or through) the Eleventh
Amendment,173 or limiting efforts at cooperative federalism on Tenth
Amendment “anti-commandeering” grounds,174 are not consistent
with Black’s approach because they do not identify grounds for
decision that derive fundamentally from constitutional text. In the
case of state sovereign immunity, the Court’s majority has claimed
reliance on a principle said to pre-exist the 1787 constitution,175
whereas the anti-commandeering rationale is linked to particular
notions of electoral transparency.176 There may be a story to tell that
could connect these rationales to essential constitutional structures or
basic institutional relationships central to our constitutional
system,177 but none of these cases provides that grounding and none
173. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996); Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 728–29 (1999).
174. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997).
175. The Court’s analysis in Seminole Tribe and Alden v. Maine considers, in addition to the
original, unamended constitution, the text of the Eleventh Amendment, the text of the Court’s
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), and the text of its decision in Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). None of these texts, however, is claimed as the basis for the
sovereign immunity the Court recognizes. Instead, the Court concludes that the states’ immunity
from suit “is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the
ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 (emphasis
added). Essentially, following the logic of Hans, the Court’s majority in Seminole Tribe explained
that this sovereign immunity exceeds the plain language of the Eleventh Amendment, because
that constitutional text was intended merely to correct the error the Court committed in Chisholm
by permitting diversity suits against a state in federal court. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69.
176. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 168–69 (“[W]here the Federal Government
directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated
from the electoral ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus diminished when, due to
federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local
electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.”).
177. In his majority opinion in Printz, Justice Scalia acknowledged that “there is no
constitutional text speaking to the precise question whether congressional action compelling state
officers to execute federal laws is unconstitutional.” Printz, 521 U.S at 898, 905. Instead, he
explained, “the answer to the CLEOs’ challenge must be sought in historical understanding and
practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court.” Id. When he
turned to structural reasoning, however, Justice Scalia’s argument was focused on grounding a
theory of residual state sovereignty generally rather than the anti-commandeering principle more
particularly. In his discussion of state sovereignty, Justice Scalia drew from a variety of
constitutional provisions, including some that go beyond grant and prohibition. Thus, he asserted
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identifies with sufficient precision the textual basis for claiming
those foundations.178
that, in ratifying the constitution, the states retained a “residuary and inviolable sovereignty,” id.
at 919, that is
reflected throughout the Constitution’s text, Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76
(1869); Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869), including (to mention only a few
examples) the prohibition on any involuntary reduction or combination of a State’s
territory, Art. IV, § 3; the Judicial Power Clause, Art. III, § 2, and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, Art. IV, § 2, which speak of the “Citizens” of the States; the
amendment provision, Article V, which requires the votes of three-fourths of the States
to amend the Constitution; and the Guarantee Clause, Art. IV, § 4, which “presupposes
the continued existence of the states and . . . those means and instrumentalities which
are the creation of their sovereign and reserved rights,” Helvering v. Gerhardt,
304 U.S. 405, 414–415 (1938). Residual state sovereignty was also implicit, of course,
in the Constitution’s conferral upon Congress of not all governmental powers, but only
discrete, enumerated ones, Art. I, § 8, which implication was rendered express by the
Tenth Amendment’s assertion that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”
Id. (omission and alteration in original). By contrast, the anti-commandeering principle that
Justice Scalia derived from this theory of residual sovereignty is not similarly grounded in
structural reasoning tied to constitutional text. Instead, Justice Scalia, like Justice O’Connor in
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 163–66, supported the anti-commandeering prohibition by
historical arguments about the Framers’ preference for the Virginia Plan over the New Jersey
Plan and by conclusory assertions as to attributes he assigned to the notion of state sovereignty.
Printz, 521 U.S at 918–22. Fundamental to residual state sovereignty, he explained, is the
“[p]reservation of the States as independent and autonomous political entities.” Id. at 928. The
difficulty, of course, is that none of the provisions that Justice Scalia employed as the basis for
finding retained state sovereignty necessarily leads to the further conclusion that the States are
properly understood as fully independent and autonomous entities, let alone that they cannot be
required in some circumstances to assist in the deployment of federal undertakings. Indeed, as
Justice Story pointed out in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), the
independence and autonomy of the states as political entities was limited from the start, in Article
I, section 10 and elsewhere in the Constitution. Story thus notes that the Constitution “is crowded
with provisions which restrain or annul the sovereignty of the states in some of the highest
branches of their prerogatives.” Id. at 343. One reasonably could take the view that the
sovereignty retained by the states includes the power of their respective legislatures to consider
and pass on policy initiatives favored by the central government, which is the feature of
independence and autonomy at issue in New York v. United States, and one might seek to build a
case that residual state sovereignty even includes ministerial executive branch functions like those
challenged in Printz. But the Court’s majorities in both cases, adverting to a theory of electoral
transparency espoused by academic commentators, see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at
168–169 (citing Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 61–62 (1988); D. Bruce La Pierre, Political
Accountability in the National Political Process—The Alternative to Judicial Review of
Federalism Issues, 80 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 577, 639–65 (1985)), simply fail to demonstrate that
such powers necessarily are grounded in the essential structures and relationships created by the
text of the Constitution.
178. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment states: “The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against any one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.” Id. This text does bar some suits arguably within the original
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The majority opinions in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida179
and Alden v. Maine,180 for example, do offer a story about the
foundations of state sovereign immunity, but it is not an account that
relies on constitutional text, considered either narrowly or
holistically. Once the majority in Seminole Tribe and Alden conceded
that broad sovereign immunity is not conferred by the Eleventh
Amendment, they had only the pre-Eleventh Amendment
constitution and pre-constitutional English legal history with which
to work. But they did not read such immunity in the text of the
original constitution either; rather, they read it in the Constitution’s
English history and its subsequent judicial interpretation.181
Moreover, the story the Court tells gets wrong the English
history on which it depends. The Alden Court explained that
“essential principles of federalism” dictate that the “Congress treat
the States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary
sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation.”182
The Framers, they claimed, “thought it ‘neither becoming nor
convenient that the several States of the Union, invested with that
large residuum of sovereignty which had not been delegated to the
United States, should be summoned as defendants to answer the
complaints of private persons.’”183 This notion, that the Framers
intended the states to be invested with sovereign immunity, in turn
derives from a presumption that the Framers were applying essential
principles of English common law and political theory.184
grant of federal judicial power, which “extend[s] to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
[the] Constitution [and] the Laws of the United States” as well as “to Controversies . . . between a
State and Citizens of another State,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, but leaves intact federal judicial
power premised on a federal question. In order to find immunity from suit in cases falling within
the arising under jurisdiction of the federal courts, the majority in Seminole Tribe and Alden,
therefore, were forced to draw from outside the text of the Constitution itself. “To rest on the
words of the Amendment alone,” they warned, “would be to engage in [a] type of ahistorical
literalism,” which has been rightly “rejected.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 730. Thus, the Seminole Tribe
majority asserted that “the Eleventh Amendment reflects ‘the fundamental principle of sovereign
immunity [that] limits the grant of judicial authority in Article III.’” 517 U.S. at 64 (alteration in
original) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97–98 (1984)), but
does not expressly confer that protection from suit. “[T]he sovereign immunity of the States,” the
Alden majority explained, “neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh
Amendment.” 527 U.S. at 713.
179. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
180. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
181. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69; Alden, 527 U.S. at 748.
182. 527 U.S. at 748.
183. Id. (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).
184. See id. at 733, 748.
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In the English tradition, sovereign dignity belonged, of political,
social, and legal necessity, to the person of the sovereign. According
to Blackstone, sovereignty grounded the king’s prerogative, the
bundle of rights that the king alone possessed.185 Significantly,
however, the awful dignity of the king had two aspects: magisterial
and servile.186 The former, the Seminole Tribe and Alden majorities
translate from king to republican state; the latter, they ignore. To the
extent that the magisterial aspect of sovereign dignity exalts the king,
its inseparable servile aspect limits him. Indeed, the restriction
justifies the king’s exaltation. The law exalts the king (and by
extension republican states) above all others only if, and so far as, the
king submits to the law. “The principal duty of the king,” says
Blackstone, “is, to govern his people according to law. . . . And
this . . . has always been esteemed an express part of the common
law of England, even when prerogative was at the highest.”187
Therefore, when the king has done what he is not allowed to do,
when he has broken the law and injured any of his subjects,
sovereign dignity obligates him to waive his immunity from suit, so
that the injury may be redressed (and his sovereign dignity restored).
The Supreme Court’s half-translation of sovereign dignity from
monarch to republican state thus accords the personified state the
privilege of immunity without the concomitant, assumed obligation
of consent to suit.
But, beyond this misreading of English legal history, and
beyond the problematic assignment of the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts’ unmoored form of structural analysis to Charles Black’s
legacy, there is an even more fundamental problem with Professor
Manning’s invocation of Black’s work. Manning’s basic premise,
that the Necessary and Proper Clause is somehow a “master
provision” that, considered on its own, “allocates decisionmaking
responsibility”188 simply is inconsistent with Black’s account. Black

185. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *239.
186. Id. at *234 n.1.
187. Id. at *233–34. Blackstone then quotes Bracton, who asserted:
The king, . . . ought not to be subject to man, but to God, and to the law; for the law
maketh the king. Let the king therefore render to the law, what the law has invested in
him with regard to others, dominion and power: for he is not truly king, where will and
pleasure rules, and not the law.
Id. at *234.
188. Manning, supra note 11, at 7.
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did not view the clause as granting power to any particular
institution, whether it be Congress or the courts. Indeed, his reading
of McCulloch was that Chief Justice Marshall had already
determined the constitutional allocation of authority at issue in that
case, based on more general reasoning, before he even got to the
Necessary and Proper Clause.189 Black, like Marshall, sought to
ground his work in the broad structures and relationships created by
the whole document (or large portions of it) and not on individual
passages, including the precise text of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. To be sure, the Necessary and Proper Clause conceivably
might be one ingredient, contributing alongside numerous other
provisions in the rich textual stew supporting the Court’s
identification of essential structures and relationships embedded in
the whole Constitution, but standing alone, that bit of text is not,
under Black’s method, a source of congressional authority, whether
it be incidental implementation authority or plenary general
authority.190
B. Structural Reasoning and Judicial Restraint
Manning’s account of the Court’s approach to questions of
Congressional power over the past eighty-five years is, however,
instructive in advancing our understanding of the distinct strains of
structural reasoning in constitutional law. At the heart of Manning’s
analysis is his identification of a “paradox of contemporary structural
constitutional law.”191 The paradox is that the Supreme Court
increasingly has adopted a “new textualism” in matters of statutory
construction, which has resulted in an approach that is highly
deferential to Congress’s legislative choices, while simultaneously
demonstrating less deference to Congress’s exercise of authority in
cases raising constitutional questions of federal regulatory
authority.192 Thus, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts’ new
structuralism has smuggled general principles of limitation into the
Tenth Amendment in anti-commandeering cases like New York v.
United States,193 into the Eleventh Amendment in state sovereign
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See BLACK, supra note 1, at 14.
See id.
Manning, supra note 11, at 4.
See id.
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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immunity cases like Seminole Tribe,194 and into the Necessary and
Proper Clause in cases like National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius.195 As Manning properly points out, all of these
new doctrines result from a “free-form version” of structural
reasoning that is not tied to constitutional text, and, as elaborated and
applied, provides very few limits on judicial discretion.196
By contrast, Manning’s account of the Supreme Court’s postNew Deal approach to federalism questions makes clear that those
cases, although also characterized as rooted in structural reasoning,
deployed decisional principles derived from the written Constitution
and were expressly much more deferential to the decision making of
the political branches.197 On Manning’s telling, the Court’s version
of structural reasoning in this period was informed by Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch, and resulted in the Court acting
like a “gentle Thayerian in structural constitutional cases.”198 Like
Marshall in McCulloch, the post-New Deal Justices conceived of the
constitutional order as “unfinished” and resting on “a frame of
government ‘intended to endure for ages’ and ‘to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs.’”199 This work of adaptation, at least
in cases involving the scope of federal power, was understood as
falling within the ken of Congress. Thus, notwithstanding the
enumerative language in Article 1, Section 8, both Marshall and his
intellectual heirs on the Court in the post-New Deal era understood
that “in matters of implementation” Congress had to be accorded
wide latitude in fashioning legislative policies, and that the Court’s
job was simply to ensure that those implementation decisions
comported broadly with the frame of government conveyed by the
broad structural language of the constitution.200

194. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
195. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
196. Manning, supra note 11, at 31–32.
197. Id. at 10–12.
198. Id. at 3, 10–12. Professor Manning’s reference here is to James Bradley Thayer, whose
1893 article urging judicial restraint in the exercise of the Court’s constitutional judicial review
authority influenced a generation of constitutional scholars and judges, and ultimately formed the
foundations for Alexander Bickel’s work. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
199. Manning, supra note 11, at 10 (quoting Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819)).
200. Id. at 11.
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Manning reads the post-New Deal federalism cases as relying on
the Necessary and Proper Clause as the constitutional basis for
finding this broad congressional authority to determine questions of
implementation, and argues that that clause ought to serve as a
textual toehold for the current Court to adopt a similar stance of
judicial deference towards Congress’s exercise of significant
incidental powers.201 Absent the anchoring effect of the Necessary
and Proper Clause, Manning is concerned that “free-form” structural
reasoning would permit unnecessarily broad judicial discretion that
potentially could place the Court in a position of unwarranted
activism of the sort he attributes to the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts’ Tenth and Eleventh Amendment adventures.202 The Court’s
deference in these matters, however, can be just as effectively
grounded in the Constitution’s essential structures and relationships
as in a particular reading of the text of the Necessary and Proper
Clause or any other particular constitutional text taken on its own. In
fact, when the Court embraces Thayerian modesty on broad grounds
derived from constitutional structure and relationship, its decisions
avoid the sort of judicial instrumentalism often evident in the Court’s
highly subjective interpretations of the Constitution’s various
provisions of grant or prohibition that “afford reasonable people
plenty of room to strike the balance in different ways between
federalism and nationalism or separation and interdependence.”203
i. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority204
provides a good example of the Court grounding a commitment to
judicial deference in the Constitution’s broad structures and
relationships. In repudiating the Court’s more assertive stance in
National League of Cities v. Usery205 that the Tenth Amendment
provides a limit on the federal government’s authority to impose
regulations on the states, Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion in
Garcia systematically examined and rejected a range of judicial
approaches for determining whether a federal statute trenches on a
201. See id. at 6.
202. See id. at 31–32.
203. Id. at 32.
204. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
205. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
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“traditional governmental function,” the standard that had developed
from National League of Cities.206 For good reason, Blackmun
concluded that looking to tradition and settled state practice would be
“unworkable” in distinguishing sovereign from proprietary state
functions, given the evolving and varied roles that state and local
governments have played over time.207 He also rejected doctrinal
formulations derived from tort sovereign immunity cases and from
tax immunity precedent208 before concluding that
there is a more fundamental problem at work here . . . . The
problem is that neither the governmental/proprietary
distinction nor any other that purports to separate out
important governmental functions can be faithful to the role
of federalism in a democratic society. . . . Any rule of state
immunity that looks to the “traditional,” “integral,” or
“necessary” nature of governmental functions inevitably
invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions
about which state policies it favors and which ones it
dislikes.209
In place of judicially enforceable limitations on Congress’s
exercise of its Commerce Clause authority over the states, Justice
Blackmun and his colleagues in the Court’s majority adopted an
explicit stance of deference to Congress’s legislative choices, noting
that “the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of
the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal
Government itself.”210 By identifying the various means by which
state interests are safeguarded in the very design of the federal
system, the Court repudiated the Tenth Amendment judicial activism
of the National League of Cities majority and avoided the essentially
insoluble problem of determining, through the parsing of
constitutional text or otherwise, the shape and extent of state
immunity from federal laws of general application.211

206. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 538–47.
207. Id. at 543–47.
208. Id. at 541–43, 545.
209. Id. at 545–46.
210. Id. at 550.
211. Id. at 547–48 (“We doubt that courts ultimately can identify principled constitutional
limitations on the scope of Congress’[s] Commerce Clause powers over the States merely by
relying on a priori definitions of state sovereignty.”).
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ii. The Necessary and Proper Clause Alternative
While structural reasoning thus can be a sound basis for the
Court’s embrace of judicial modesty, the Court’s more recent Tenth
and Eleventh Amendment cases suggest that, in its more free-form
manifestations, this approach may not reliably lead to judicial
restraint.212 Manning’s alternative is to offer up the Necessary and
Proper Clause as the main textual source of Congress’s broad power
to adopt incidental measures to implement the plenary general
authority held by the central government under the constitution.213
While Manning’s approach seems compelling, it is not clear that it is
likely to be any more effective in limiting the Court’s unwarranted
incursions into Congress’s exercise of its constitutional authority.
Manning’s strategy, to rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause to
limit judicial discretion by recognizing Congress’s broad
implementing authority, necessarily locks in the enumerative
language of Article I, Section 8 as the principal source of the federal
government’s plenary general authority subject to Congress’s
implementation.214 As discussed earlier, however, while some of the
specific provisions of grant and prohibition in Article I’s
enumeration have worn well over time, others have fallen out of
alignment with the underlying economic, social, cultural, and
political context within which the Constitution must operate.215 In
those instances, where the enumeration represents a miscalculation,
significant pressure is placed on the Necessary and Proper Clause to
bring constitutional doctrine into alignment with contemporary
circumstance and, indirectly, with the deeper structures and
relationships that ground the constitutional order. Not surprisingly,
because of ongoing contests over the meaning and scope of some of
the most important enumerated powers, the Court’s characterization
of (and reliance on) the Necessary and Proper Clause has not been a
model of consistency.

212. See Manning, supra note 11, at 31–39.
213. See id. at 63–65. Manning notes that the Necessary and Proper Clause operates not only
by reference to other express powers held by Congress under the constitution but also upon “all
the ‘Powers’ vested by the Constitution anywhere in the government.” Id. at 63.
214. See id. Manning is careful to say that the powers conferred on Congress by the
Necessary and Proper Clause, while broad and extensive, are incidental to and meant to
implement the general plenary powers conveyed by other provisions in the Constitution.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 146–58.
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Thus, in Comstock, which involved a constitutional challenge to
a federal statute permitting the civil commitment of individuals in the
custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons upon a finding that those
individuals have a serious mental disability or disorder and are
“sexually dangerous,” Justice Breyer, writing for a seven-person
majority, offered two apparently inconsistent formulations of the socalled “sweeping clause.”216 On the one hand, he asserted that “the
Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad authority to
enact federal legislation.”217 On the other hand, he noted that “the
Necessary and Proper Clause makes clear that the Constitution’s
grants of specific federal legislative authority are accompanied by
broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, or useful’ or
‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’”218 In elaborating
his “makes clear” language, Breyer quoted Marshall in McCulloch,
noting that Congress’s broad implementing powers are drawn from a
“vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the
constitution.”219 This distinction between “granting” power versus
“making clear” its availability may seem an unimportant semantic
difference with little practical doctrinal significance, but the
ambiguity in Justice Breyer’s varying characterizations does signal a
deeper problem with the Court’s practice of linking its understanding
of the Necessary and Proper Clause to its (unstable) treatment of the
Commerce Clause and other provisions within the enumerations in
Article I, Section 8. If the enumerated general power is construed
narrowly, significant pressure is placed on the Court, at least in those
instances where the federal regulatory effort is otherwise welcomed
by the Justices, to read the Necessary and Proper Clause as a specific
textual source for additional constitutional authority. If, however, the
enumerated power is read broadly—or interpreted pragmatically to
go beyond its literal terms—then the Necessary and Proper Clause
commands less attention from the Court and becomes, at best, a
confirmatory textual basis for that result.220
216. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 129–30 (2010); cf. Lawson & Granger, supra
note 167 (referring to the Necessary and Proper Clause as “the Sweeping Clause”).
217. Comstock, 560 U.S. at 133 (emphasis added).
218. Id. at 133–34 (emphasis added) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 413, 418 (1819)).
219. Id.
220. In Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960), for example, a disagreement among the
Justices about the meaning of Article I, Section 8, Clause 14, which directs Congress “[t]o make
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This dynamic can be seen most clearly in the contrast between
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in Gonzales v. Raich221 and
Justice Scalia’s concurrence.222 The issue in Gonzales was whether
the federal statute regulating drugs, the Controlled Substances Act

Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” in turn led the Court to
disagree on the very question of whether the Necessary and Proper Clause conveys any authority
at all to Congress. The case concerned the constitutional validity of peace time court martial trials
of civilians “accompanying the armed forces outside the United States” who were “charged with
noncapital offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.” Kinsella, 361 U.S. at 235. In the
course of considering whether the due process clause was implicated by the procedural limitations
of the military trials offered the civilians, Justice Clark for the majority observed:
Nor do we believe that due process considerations bring about an expansion of Clause
14 through the operation of the Necessary and Proper Clause. If the exercise of the
power is valid it is because it is granted in Clause 14, not because of the Necessary and
Proper Clause. The latter clause is not itself a grant of power, but a caveat that the
Congress possesses all the means necessary to carry out the specifically granted
“foregoing” powers of § 8 “and all other Powers vested by this Constitution . . . .” As
James Madison explained, the Necessary and Proper Clause is “but merely a
declaration, for the removal of all uncertainty, that the means of carrying into
execution those [powers] otherwise granted are included in the grant.”
Id. at 247 (first emphasis added) (omission in original).
In dissent, Justice Harlan took issue with the majority’s reading of Article I, Section 8, Clause 14,
and of the due process implications of trying civilians according to the procedural rules of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. Writing for himself and for Justice Frankfurter, Harlan stated:
Of course, the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be used to “expand” powers which
are otherwise constitutionally limited, but that is only to say that when an asserted
power is not appropriate to the exercise of an express power, to which all “necessary
and proper” powers must relate, the asserted power is not a “proper” one. But to say, as
the Court does now, that the Necessary and Proper Clause “is not itself a grant of
power” is to disregard Clause 18 as one of the enumerated powers of § 8 of Art. I.
Id. at 254–55 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In part, this inconsistent understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause derives from the
Court’s inconsistent treatment of the enumerative language of Article 1, Section 8 as either
formally setting the boundaries of federal government power or as the starting point for a more
practical, empirical understanding of federalism. When the Court veers towards formalism, it is
more inclined to lean heavily on the Necessary and Proper Clause as a workaround. When, on the
other hand, the Court’s reading of the Commerce Clause and other provisions of grant and
prohibition are capacious, their need for and reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause is
reduced. Professor Black would argue that this dynamic, which produces doctrinal inconsistency,
compare United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked authority
under the Commerce Clause to enact a section of the Violence Against Women Act, which
provided a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence), with Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1 (2005) (holding Congress possessed authority under the Commerce Clause to extend the
Controlled Substances Act to the cultivation and possession of marijuana for medical use), and
undermines judicial candor, could be avoided by reverting to reasoning from structure and
relation.
221. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
222. See id. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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(CSA),223 as applied to the intrastate possession of medical marijuana
pursuant to a valid state law, exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority.224 Justice Stevens framed the question as a “modest one,”
which was whether Congress had a rational basis for concluding that
possession of locally produced medical marijuana, in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce.225 Given the
comprehensive closed regulatory scheme that Congress had adopted
in the CSA, Stevens and his majority colleagues determined that
Congress could rationally have concluded that medical marijuana
authorized under State law might be drawn into the regulated
interstate market for illegal marijuana, and on that basis could be
prohibited by the federal statute.226
Crucially, given that the Court was working within the modern
Commerce Clause framework it had established in Lopez and United
States v. Morrison,227 the question whether the regulated activity
itself was economic in nature became an issue essential to
determining the reach of the Commerce Clause.228 Justice Stevens
addressed this element of the Lopez/Morrison framework by
explaining that “the activities regulated by the CSA are
quintessentially economic. ‘Economics’ refers to ‘the production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities.’”229 Noting that the
CSA regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of
drugs, and that the intrastate consumption of medical marijuana falls
within that broad definition, the majority determined that the
Lopez/Morrison requirement, that the substantial effects prong of the
Commerce Clause test be limited to economic activities, had been
satisfied.230

223. The Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2018), is Title II of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat.
1236, 1242 (1970).
224. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 5.
225. Id. at 22.
226. See id. at 27–29.
227. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
228. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 24–26; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995);
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610–13.
229. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 25–26 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 720 (1966)).
230. See id. at 26. While Justice Stevens mentions the Necessary and Proper Clause in
passing, it is clear that the opinion does not place primary, or even significant, reliance on that
provision as the basis for finding congressional authority in this case. See id. at 5.
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Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, based his conclusion
that the CSA, as applied, was constitutional on grounds he
characterized as, “if not inconsistent with that of the Court, at least
more nuanced.”231 Scalia’s “more nuanced” approach placed much
greater emphasis than did Justice Stevens on the Necessary and
Proper Clause as the principal source of the federal government’s
authority to regulate local medical marijuana and did so precisely
because he defined the terms of the Lopez/Morrison limitation of the
Commerce Clause to economic activities more narrowly.232 Scalia
rejected the majority’s characterization of consumption as an
economic activity and thereby concluded that the possession and use
of medical marijuana at issue in Gonzales was noneconomic,233 but
he nonetheless determined that “Congress may regulate even
noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a
more general regulation of interstate commerce.”234 Thus, because,
in Scalia’s view, Congress derives authority from the Necessary and
Proper Clause to legislate with respect to activities not otherwise
within their enumerated power, when reaching those noneconomic
activities is an essential “means” to accomplishing a legitimate
constitutional “end,” the application of the CSA to the possession
and use of medical marijuana that had been sanctioned by state law
was permissible.235
What this dispute over the dictionary definition of the term
“economic” obscures,236 and what is also missed in the indirectly
linked disagreement over whether the Necessary and Proper Clause
confers implementing federal regulatory authority or merely
confirms its existence, is a more fundamental question concerning
the capacity of individual states to manage difficult problems of
public policy, the effects of which reverberate through national (and
global) markets. Instead of consulting Webster’s Third for the
meaning of a term such as “economic,” the Court would be well
served to consider the respective institutional competences of the
231. Id. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring).
232. See id. at 34–36.
233. See id. at 40.
234. Id. at 37.
235. Id. at 37, 39–41.
236. Not to mention the Court’s shifting practice of insisting either that the regulated activity
must be economic or alternatively, as in Wickard, merely that the effects of that activity in the
aggregate must be economic. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942).
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competing regulators (state legislatures and administrative agencies
versus Congress and associated federal agencies) in any given
instance, and the challenges presented as a result of state
coordination problems;237 the need for policy experimentation in the
context of varying state and local conditions;238 and the gains and
losses in electoral responsiveness when questions are addressed at
the state or federal level.239 In her dissent in Gonzales, Justice
O’Connor raised some of these core questions, but she did so in an
abbreviated fashion given that her opinion was constrained by the
limited framing offered by Lopez and Morrison.240 The Court’s
analysis in Comstock also engaged some of these questions
respecting the relative capacity and willingness of individual states
versus the federal government to manage the particular problem at
issue there, although the discussion toggled uncomfortably between a
formalist consideration of the Necessary and Proper Clause and a
more practical, empirical discussion of the particular shortcomings in
individual state-level responses to the problem of sexually dangerous
persons released from federal custody that had led Congress to
intervene in the first place.241

237. See Game Theoretical Perspective, supra note 163, at 26–56; Conflicting Premises,
supra note 163, at 468–71.
238. See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (describing a model in which “subnational”
units of government are free to set goals and craft strategies for implementing them). But see
David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of
Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008) (offering critique of democratic
experimentalism).
239. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1992) (“But where the Federal
Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of
public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”).
240. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 42–57 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
241. See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 144–46, 176–78 (2010). Justice Breyer
emphasized that the challenged federal statute “requires accommodation of state interests,”
because it mandates notice to the state in which a federal prisoner “is domiciled or was tried” and
requires that the prisoner be released to state custody if the state wishes to take responsibility, but
is nonetheless necessary because many states do not take such responsibility given that lengthy
federal incarceration often severs an individual’s ties to his or her home state. Id. at 144–46.
Justice Thomas disagreed that the statute respects the authority of state civil commitment
authorities and with the premise that states would not be available to take charge of a dangerous
person upon his or her release from federal prison. See id. at 176–78 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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C. Professor Black’s Pragmatism
If the Justices in these cases and others like them were to take
seriously Charles Black’s method of reasoning from structure and
relationship instead of becoming consumed in flights of formulaic
reasoning centered on narrow constitutional provisions of grant and
prohibition, this distracting doctrinal noise could be minimized or
even eliminated. There likely would continue to be considerable
subjectivity in the Court’s reasoning, but working from structural
premises and the perceived exigencies of institutional arrangements
would tend to emphasize the features of constitutional disputes,
especially disputes over the power of the federal government, that
actually motivate the competing positions on the Court.242
Comparing Chief Justice Roberts’s controlling opinion in
Sebelius with Justice Ginsburg’s separate opinion helps to make this
point.243 At issue in Sebelius was the constitutionality of the socalled individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act, which required
most Americans to maintain “minimum essential” health insurance
or pay a penalty to the Internal Revenue Service.244 A majority of the
Justices determined that the individual mandate in the ACA was
beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, although a
differently configured majority upheld the mandate as a permissible
exercise of the taxing authority.245 On the Commerce Clause issue,
242. As Professor Blasi points out, the Court’s adoption of Black’s method could also impact
the way some disputes are framed from the inception and thereby change the nature of the
information that is made available to judges.
To the extent that structural reasoning would result in a refashioning of lawsuits, with
different information coming to the attention of judges, Black’s structural approach
may well lead to judicial intuitions and preconceptions that can be considered to be
more sophisticated and thereby, quite apart from subjective desirability of the results
that might ensue, improvements of “process.”
Blasi, supra note 14, at 189–90. Moreover, the more common use of reasoning from structure and
relationship could shift the focus of potential litigants and courts from “particularized grievances”
to “complaints that concern systemic shortcomings.” Id. at 186. These shifts in information, issue
framing and systems analysis, in turn, could impact “even the lawsuits that are brought.” Id. at
185.
243. Compare Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 547–58 (2012) (asserting
the individual mandate of the ACA is beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause powers because it
does not regulate existing commerce), with id. at 604–08 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (asserting that the ACA instead regulates inevitable market participation).
244. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)–(b) (2018). More recently, in Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355
(5th Cir. 2019), the Fifth Circuit upheld a district court ruling that the ACA’s individual mandate
is unconstitutional because it no longer carries a tax penalty that generates tax revenues but
declined to find the entire statute unconstitutional. Id. at 390, 393.
245. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 558, 563–66.
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the Chief Justice relied on two principal grounds for concluding that
the Commerce Clause does not support the imposition of a federal
obligation to purchase health insurance. The first ground centered on
the word “regulate” in the Commerce Clause.246 Roberts’s highly
formalistic analysis reasoned that, while the text confers upon
Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states, it does
not grant Congress the power to create the activity or class of
activities to be regulated. “The power to regulate commerce,” he
explained, “presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be
regulated.”247 To support this conclusion, the Chief Justice noted that
constitutional text grants Congress the power both to “coin Money”
and to “regulate the Value thereof,” and to “raise and support
Armies . . . and naval Forces” and to “make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”248 From
these features he concluded that, if the power to regulate includes the
“power to bring the subject of the regulation into existence,” then the
provisions governing money and the armed forces would be
superfluous, thus violating the rule against surplusage.249
In addition to this extraordinarily literal textualist argument
centered on one word in a provision of grant or prohibition, Chief
Justice Roberts also mounted an argument that the individual
mandate exceeds Congress’s authority because it undermines broad
notions of state sovereignty inherent in American federalism and
operationalized through the requirement that authority exercised by
Congress pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause must be
“proper.”250 While nominally a ground for decision based on specific
text—the word “proper” in the Necessary and Proper Clause—
Professor Manning argues that Roberts’s elaboration of the principles
of state sovereignty and federalism in this instance is an example of
structural reasoning of the sort he regards as problematic.251 The
Chief Justice signaled his intention to draw upon broad constitutional

246. See id. at 547–58.
247. Id. at 550.
248. See id. (discussing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 5, 12–14).
249. Id. Notably, Justice Ginsburg and the other justices joining her dissent argued that the
action/inaction distinction itself is suspect in this context. In their view, the ACA’s individual
mandate does not force activity but instead regulates inevitable market participation. See id. at
604–08 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
250. See id. at 559–61.
251. See Manning, supra note 11, at 41–42.
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principles to support his position by pointing out early in his opinion
the following features of the American constitutional system: first,
Congress’s powers are limited by the terms of the enumeration in
Article I, Section 8;252 second, the Constitution is not the source of
the states’ police powers, which remained in the states as a residuum
after limited federal powers were conferred by way of the written
Constitution;253 and third, the state sovereignty thus retained is a
source of individual liberty, because it ensures that “the facets of
governing that touch on citizens’ daily lives are normally
administered by smaller governments closer to the governed” and
“also serves as a check on the power of the Federal Government.”254
Justice Ginsburg’s separate opinion, by contrast, is also based
primarily on reasoning from structure and relationship.255 But
Ginsburg announced a very different set of constitutional principles
to ground her analysis. First, she identified the individual state
incompetence principle, which she described as central to the
Framers’ response to the failures of the Articles of Confederation.256
The Articles, she reminds, “proved unworkable, because the
individual States, understandably focused on their own economic
interests, often failed to take actions critical to the success of the
Nation as a whole.”257 Consequently, their “solution” was to give
Congress “authority to enact economic legislation ‘in all Cases for
the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which
the States are separately incompetent.’”258 Next, Justice Ginsburg
explained that, because “[t]he Framers understood that the ‘general
Interests of the Union’ would change over time, in ways they could
not anticipate,” they devised a written constitution intended to serve

252. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 534 (“The enumeration of powers is also a limitation of
powers, because ‘[t]he enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.’” (quoting Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (alteration in original))).
253. Id. at 535–36.
254. Id. at 536.
255. See id. at 599–604 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In addition to
setting out an analysis based on broad principles, Justice Ginsburg also responds to the Chief
Justice’s narrow argument centered on the meaning of the word “regulate” and the distinction he
draws between action and inaction. See id. at 609–14.
256. Id. at 599–600.
257. Id. at 600.
258. Id. (quoting THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 2, supra note 22, at
131–32).
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as “a ‘great outlin[e],’ not a detailed blueprint.”259 And finally,
Ginsburg urged an interpretive approach to the Commerce Clause
that is based on “‘practical’ considerations, including ‘actual
experience,’”260 and suggested that this “pragmatic approach,” rather
than Roberts’s formalist reading, was “[c]onsistent with the Framers’
intent.”261
Writing in the Georgetown Law Journal before the Supreme
Court announced its decision in Sebelius, Professors Leslie Meltzer
Henry and Maxwell Stearns argued that the ACA’s individual
mandate “fits well within those cases for which congressional
commerce power is justified to avoid the risk that competing state
policies will force other states into a problematic separating game,
thereby undermining the selected regulatory policy.”262 Justice
Ginsburg’s analysis, grounded in the basic principles she identified,
adopted the intuition suggested by Meltzer Henry and Stearns. Thus,
she concluded:
States that undertake health-care reforms on their own thus
risk “placing themselves in a position of economic
disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors.”
Facing that risk, individual States are unlikely to take the
initiative in addressing the problem of the uninsured, even
though solving that problem is in all States’ best interests.
Congress’ intervention was needed to overcome this
collective-action impasse.263
One could certainly conclude that Chief Justice Roberts’s
judgment (that public health policy is better determined at the state
level where decision makers are closer to their constituents) was
superior to Justice Ginsburg’s evaluation (that the dynamics of the
national market for health care services and health insurance render
individual states suboptimal policy makers), but it is difficult to see
how the Justices’ strained arguments over the meaning of the phrase
“to regulate,” or their arcane disagreements over whether the
259. Id. at 601 (second alteration in original) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)).
260. Id. (quoting Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41–42
(1937)).
261. Id. at 601–02.
262. Henry & Stearns, supra note 81, at 1118.
263. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 595 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citations omitted).
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regulated subject of the ACA’s individual mandate was “action” or
“inaction,” advanced any of the real interests at stake. Reasonable
people can certainly differ over these fundamental questions, and
over the prior question of which institution (Congress or the Court)
ought to have the final word on the matter, but pretending that the
narrow textual provisions of grant and prohibition developed by
delegates to the constitutional convention are the best, or even a
good, way to resolve these questions disserves the very enterprise of
maintaining and operating a workable constitutional order.264
CONCLUSION
Charles Black’s central insight was that candor and clarity in the
project of constitutional interpretation are advanced when the
Supreme Court and other courts exercising the power of judicial
review frankly embrace a methodology of reasoning from
constitutional structure and institutional relationships. Notably, Black
taught that the appropriate use of reasoning from structure and
relationship is a form of textual construction, not a repudiation of
text. He insisted that the Court should embrace “a close and
perpetual interworking between the textual and the relational and
structural modes of reasoning, for the structure and relations
concerned are themselves created by the text, and inference drawn
from them must surely be controlled by the text.”265
Black certainly understood that clause-bound textual
interpretation had been and would continue to be a significant
component of the work of the Court. “[S]o long as we continue to
look on our Constitution as a part of the law applicable in court, just
so long the work of sheer textual interpretation will be a great part—
probably the greatest part—of judicial work in constitutional law.”266
Even the parsing of individual provisions of grant or prohibition,
however, requires the exercise, more or less, of interpretive

264. On this account, constitutional interpretation and implementation occur throughout the
government, and indeed outside of government, as well as in the courts. An approach to
constitutional judicial review that highlights underlying structural principles and institutional
relationships instead of focusing on sterile bits of text considered in isolation is likely to facilitate
the interactive process by which these various actors engage one another and, in the process,
recommit to the constitutional order. For a fuller account of the operation of constitutionalism
outside of the courts, see GRABER, supra note 60.
265. BLACK, supra note 1, at 31.
266. Id.
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judgment. Often, the rules by which individual passages of grant or
prohibition are decoded derive from broader structural and relational
directives that in turn can be traced to other portions of the written
constitution (or to the constitutional text taken as a whole).267
Professor Black’s recognition of this essential dialogue between
text and structure, both in cases involving relatively narrow
prescriptive constitutional passages, as well as in cases that expressly
implicate the institutional relations that derive from broad
constitutional structure, distinguishes his approach from the new
structuralism of the Rehnquist and Roberts courts. His notion of
dialogue invites us to read constitutional language in context and
moves us toward an understanding of constitutional practice that,
while rooted in the written text, also draws insight from the tradition
of unwritten constitutional development.
Provisions that have served to advance the broader objectives of
the American constitutional enterprise are entitled to greater fidelity
and should be relied upon in determining the outcome in specific
instances of constitutional controversy. Others that have receded in
practical importance because of their misfit with ongoing
circumstances or that have essentially been rewritten or reimagined
by subsequent decisions should be accorded an appropriately reduced
weight, given that diminished practical importance and/or revision
over time. On those occasions where it is plain that a provision of
grant or prohibition, such as the Commerce Clause, was the product
of significant miscalculation,268 it is appropriate for the Supreme
Court and other reviewing courts to look to the broader constitutional
principles embedded in the document’s structures and institutional
relationships to resolve ongoing questions of national importance.
The repeated endorsement by the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention of the principle that the federal government should
exercise authority when the states individually cannot was not
displaced by the enumerative language of Article I, Section 8. The
267. All texts, including constitutional texts, must be read according to an agreed upon set of
rules. Ian Bartrum, drawing broadly on the language theory of Ludwig Wittgenstein, has
explained that “language is something we do, not something that we have. Further, like a game,
language is a rule-governed activity; which is to say that it is rules, not instruments (e.g. pieces or
balls) that give a particular action or utterance a particular ‘meaning.’” Ian C. Bartrum,
Wittgenstein’s Poker: Contested Constitutionalism and the Limits of Public Meaning
Originalism, 10 WASH. UNIV. JURIS. REV. 29, 35 (2017).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 145–57.
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enumerations, including the Commerce Clause, are surely part of the
text—the Constitution as law—with which courts and others charged
with constitutional interpretation must work, but these provisions
should be read in context and in the light shed by history and
experience, and according to a process of reasoning from
constitutional structure and institutional relationships.

